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CRIMINAL LAW
SEARCH, SEIZURE AND THE POSITIVE




"The Fourth Amendment is about privacy, not property."' In
criminal procedure circles, this aphorism is uncontroversial, at least
when it comes to identifying when a search occurs and whose inter-
est it invades.2 While catchy, the slogan obscures that the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures is about privacy and
property. To say that privacy is the Amendment's controlling pur-
pose ignores that only the government's property interest in the
items it seizes provides the authority to ferret out, take, destroy, or
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. I thank Mike Belknap and
Barbara Cox for their thoughtful comments, and Peter Appel, Wayne LaFave, and Toni
Massaro for their exceedingly careful, line-by-line criticisms on draft versions of this
Article. Mistakes, of course, are mine alone. I also thank colleagues at California West-
ern who attended the workshop where I first presented some of the ideas that follow,
and Dean Michael Dessent for providing me with a grant to pursue this project. Karen
Beretsky was a clever, meticulous, dependable research assistant, and I thank her.
I E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 393-94 (1971) ("[Our recent decisions ... have made it clear beyond peradven-
ture that the Fourth Amendment is not tied to the niceties of local trespass laws.");
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) ("Katz ... makes it clear that capacity to
claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the in-
vaded place ....").
2 Seizures of chattels are defined in property terms. Thus, the aphorism is rarely
applied to that aspect of Fourth Amendment protection. See infra note 220 and accom-
panying text. See also Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992) (unanimously revers-
ing Seventh Circuit's holding that carrying away someone's mobile home without legal
process or the homeowner's consent is not a Fourth Amendment seizure). Seizures of
persons involve the suspect's liberty interest and can also involve privacy, depending on
the location of the detention or arrest. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350




sell for its own benefit, a prior possessor's property. A property in-
terest makes lawful the government's temporary (for purposes of
trial) or permanent (upon forfeiture) confiscation of property from
another's possession.
For nearly forty years, the United States Supreme Court's prop-
erty-based Fourth Amendment doctrine proved "hopelessly inept"
as the sole measure for protecting against intrusions of privacy
through sophisticated forms of surveillance. 3 Then, in 1967, the
Court protected from electronic eavesdropping the conversational
privacy of a prolific basketball handicapper, 4 simply because he had
closed the door to the pay phone booth in which he was placing his
wagers, even though the listening federal agents violated no law of
property. 5 Nearly two decades later, when federal agents criminally
trespassed onto a suspect's land to view the cultivation of marijuana
plants, the Court found no privacy violation, even though a well-
established property interest was trammeled along with the blades
of grass. 6 The first case, Katz v. United States,7 abandoned a prop-
erty-based, formalistic definition of the Fourth Amendment and re-
placed it with a relativist definition based on privacy rights.8 But
Katz's virtue-its open-ended standard of privacy-also proved to
be its vice,9 insofar as the Court's freedom from the formalism of
3 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) ("The law, though jealous of individ-
ual privacy, has not kept pace with . . . advances in scientific knowledge."); Mary I.
Coombs, Shared Privay and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1593, 1607-08 (1987) ("The development of electronic wiretapping and bugging
brought to the surface certain inadequacies of property ... [which, when forced] to fit
new technology .... led to patent absurdities .... "); Richard G. Wilkens, Defining the
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: " An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077,
1114 (1987).
4 See 65 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 142 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
(statement of Burton Marks, one of Katz's three Beverly Hills attorneys, made at the end
of day-long oral argument in Katz, 389 U.S. at 347).
5 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
6 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
7 389 U.S. at 347.
8 Donald R.C. Pongrace, A Symposium of Critical Legal Study: Stereotypification of the
Fourth Amendment's Public/Private Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
1191, 1205-06, 1205 n.78 (1985) (commentators at first applauded Katz for expanding
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, but have since criticized its failure to do
the same).
9 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
385 (1974) ("Katz ... offers neither a comprehensive test of Fourth Amendment cover-
age nor any positive principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved."); Lewis
R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 554
(1990) ("[I]n the two decades since Katz was decided, the Court has applied the standard
to reduce rather than enhance Fourth Amendment protections."); Ira Mickenberg,
Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property to Priva
,
and Back, 16 NEW
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the property model allowed it to ignore the government's trespass
in the second case, United States v. Oliver.' °
This Article is about the misunderstood relationship between
the Fourth Amendment and the positive law." It shows how state
property law and other expressions of the positive law are more re-
silient and useful to Fourth Amendment analysis than the Court's
decisions of the past three decades recognize. Although history
confirms the intimate relationship between property law and the
Fourth Amendment, the high court repeatedly has said that our pri-
vacy-based Fourth Amendment has in mind a reduced, if not alto-
gether "snuffed out" 2 role for the positive law. Currently, that role
is one of pure dictum, while the Amendment remains controlled by
the Katz case, the stated purpose of which was to describe and pro-
tect our reasonable expectations of privacy. But Katz has been a dis-
mal failure-unpredictable and saddled with a stingy conception of
privacy. A renewed faith in the positive law would provide a con-
crete inventory of expectations drawn from local property, tort, con-
tract, and criminal laws. Only when the positive law recognizes no
privacy interest in a given case need we resort to Katz, which cer-
ENG. L. REV. 197, 226 (1981) ("The vague, all-encompassing test of Katz, with its depen-
dence on questions of fact for deciding fourth amendment issues, has proved just as
useful for restricting constitutional protections in the 1970's as it was for expanding
those protections a decade ago."); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS
L. REv. 275, 296 (1974) ("The clearer the understanding of what privacy is, the wiser
judgments will be concerning when to protect it and when to sacrifice it."); Pongrace,
supra note 8, at 1208-11 (suggesting that Burger Court capitalized on Katz's relativism,
forever undermining any hope of reinstituting a credible formalism as a means of pro-
tecting Fourth Amendment rights); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake:
Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 645,
650-51 (1985) ("The majority opinion [in Katz] ... bestowed a controlling role upon
privacy, but neglected to provide any clear or comprehensive standards for determining
whether a relevant privacy interest is threatened in a particular case."); see also Coombs,
supra note 3, at 1611 ("By defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment in terms of
privacy expectations and relegating property interests to a secondary role, the Court has
left lower courts without a coherent body of law with which to analyze Fourth Amend-
ment claims. Consequently, the courts have had to attempt to define the amorphous
concept of privacy.").
10 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
11 The key tenets of positivism may be stated as follows:
1) The law of a community is a special set of rules ... for the purpose of determin-
ing which behavior will be punished or coerced by the public power. These spe-
cial rules can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having
to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in which they
were adopted or developed ....
2) The set of these valid legal rules is exhaustive of "the law" .....
3) To say that someone has a "legal obligation" is to say that his case falls under a
valid legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear from doing something ....
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1978).
12 Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544-45 (1992).
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tainly may recognize a privacy interest that the positive law has
missed, but cannot be used to overcome a privacy interest that the
positive law has identified. Recognizing expressed expectations of
privacy before resorting to unexpressed ones would not only make
Fourth Amendment litigation more predictable, but more protective
as well-at least where the positive law identifies an interest that a
reviewing court could otherwise choose to ignore.
Part I of this Article analyzes the legal bases for governmental
confiscation of property by search and seizure. It traces the doctrine
that identifies which property may be searched for and seized; that
is, contraband and property of a public nature,' 3 so-called "fruits,"
instrumentalities of crime and escape, 14 and, since 1967, "mere evi-
dence" of crime, such as an armed robber's clothing.15 Because the
laws that authorize searches, seizures, and forfeitures cannot accu-
rately be said to create anything but property interests, the Supreme
Court's claim that property law and its "fictional and procedural
barriers"16 have been "discredited" 17 or "discarded" 18 is incorrect.
I thus question whether the Court has really discredited property
law, and to the extent that it has, am convinced that this changed
only the way we think and talk about the Fourth Amendment, and
was not worth the effort.
In Part II, I criticize the distorted manner in which the prop-
erty-privacy tension has been phrased. To pit these two interests
against each other incorrectly assumes that they are competing and
that one of them must prevail. Certainly, the trespass- or property-
based model protected a range of interests very similar to those pro-
tected by the privacy model. Indeed, privacy's "shift" into pri-
macy 19 occurred not because property law ignores privacy concerns,
but because traditional property concepts failed to protect against
electronic eavesdropping. In its effort to address this narrow prob-
13 Cf James M. Shellow, The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and
Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172, 174 (1964) ("[Rlequired records and public
documents, because they do not possess the character of private chattels, have been held
[seizable]."). Property of a public nature includes gasoline ration coupons, see Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-93 (1946), and draft cards, see Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
14 Harris, 331 U.S. at 154 n.17.
15 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
16 Id. at 304.
17 Id. at 306.
18 Id. at 304.
19 Id. (arguing that the substitution of suppression for replevin subordinated prop-
erty interests "through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform"); Katz,
supra note 9, at 559 ("[T]he Court recognized personal security as the core Fourth
Amendment value and shifted from a trespass to privacy analysis.").
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lem, the Court and its critics wrongly concluded that the Fourth
Amendment demands a choice between property and privacy val-
ues. To the contrary, these values are not only compatible, but are
often coterminous. As a result, I conclude in Part II that the ascen-
dancy of privacy as a Fourth Amendment standard, "without more,"
is insufficient to support the dismissal of property law.
Part III tracks the Court's uninspired discussions of property
and other positive laws, and its habitual conclusion that those laws,
while relevant, should not dictate Fourth Amendment outcomes.
Currently, the positive law remains relevant but diluted-mentioned
for unstated reasons and with inconsistency from case to case and
justice to justice. In assessing the subordinate role in which the
Court has cast property law, I argue that the contextual, relativist
nature of the Court's privacy analysis inhibits clarity20 and, ironi-
cally, sometimes even the privacy of those whose activities the gov-
ernment observes.
Finally, I conclude that although selecting which positive laws
should control Fourth Amendment outcomes may generate new
headaches in place of the familiar problems of Katz, infusing local
law into the Constitution would nevertheless be a desirable change.
The perceived threats that reliance on property law could com-
modify constitutional protections and complicate federal law with
idiosyncratic local preferences are not enough to outweigh the ways
in which reference to property law and other expressions of the pos-
itive law would enhance, not diminish, the functioning of the Fourth
Amendment. Specifically, reference to local law would fulfill the
Court's stated objective of looking outside its own holdings for the
expectations it purports to reflect.
I. THE AUTHORITY FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A. PRE-ESPIONAGE ACT
History confirms that the Executive's power to get warrants to
search for and seize persons and property requires legislative au-
thorization. 2' The oppressive general warrants that authorized the
20 See Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1088 ("[Katz] seemed to banish to legal limbo much of
the judiciary's prior experience with the Fourth Amendment, and the highly elastic
boundaries of [its] test made judicial construction of the amendment quite haphazard.");
Michael D. Granston, Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New Fourth
Amendment Housefor the Shelterless, 101 YALE LJ. 1305, 1309-10 (1992) ("In the process of
updating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court was forced to abandon the adju-
dicative simplicity of the trespass doctrine.").
21 Statutes authorizing searches and seizures were enacted as early as the early 1300s
in England. See NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
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King's messengers to search for and seize the books and papers of
any person suspected of the publication of offensive papers22 were
declared "universally invalid, except as specifically provided for by
act of Parliament."'23 Likewise, the equally abhorrent writs of assist-
ance,24 which gave tax collectors unfettered discretion to search for
and seize undutied goods, were legislative creations, 25 and the pro-
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23 (1937) (citing 9 Edw. III, St. II, ch.
1 I (1335) (giving innkeepers in port passages right to search for and seize, and share in
profits from forfeiture of, "false money imported")). Laws passed under Henry VI, the
15th Century Parliament, the Court of Star Chamber, Henry VIII, the Privy Council,
James I, Charles I, and Charles II all justified searches and seizures for various types of
undutied goods and for evidence of British subjects' dissent. Id. at 23-39. In a compre-
hensive account of the origins of the Fourth Amendment, M.H. Smith observed:
The occasions when the common law sanctioned a power of entry and search on a
man's property were few. Certainly search for smuggled goods was not one of
them. The only instance in any degree comparable occurred with stolen goods. For
these the common law did allow the issuance of a search warrant (possibly on the
principle that respect for one form of property ought not to thwart protection of
another), but that was as far as it went. If there was to be a power of entry and
search for smuggled goods that the common law courts would recognize it must be
given by statute.
MAURICE H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 16 (1978).
Of particular importance is the 1662 statute passed for England under Charles II,
which purportedly created the writs of assistance, "for better enforcement of the cus-
toms laws," LASSON, supra at 28, and SMITH, supra at 16, and the Licensing Act, which
regulated the press. LASSON, supra at 37 n.90. When the Licensing Act expired in 1679,
Charles II received a favorable court ruling that "found" a common law authority for
achieving the same results as under the 1662 statute. However, because the ChiefJus-
tice issued too many warrants on the authority of his own ruling, the House of Com-
mons promptly overturned that ruling by impeaching him. Id. at 38; see also JOHN
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY
OF RIGHTS 195 (1986) ("[H]ad there been a statute authorizing them, general warrants
would have been upheld.").
22 Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Tangible Things: Regulation of Governmental
Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487-88, 1487 n.ll (1979).
23 LASSON, supra note 21, at 49. "[T]he usage since the Revolution of issuing these
warrants, not based on any statutory authority, was absolutely illegal .... None of the
law officers of the Crown defended the legality of the warrant in the course of the parlia-
mentary debate." Id. at 48.
24 Writs of assistance were tax collection devices, receiving their first parliamentary
authorization in 1662, commanding all officers and subjects of the crown to assist in
their execution. The writs permitted any person in the company of a civil officer to
search any house, shop, warehouse, or other facility to find and remove uncustomed
goods, and to break down doors and open chests or packages as they saw fit. Huf-
stedler, supra note 22, at 1487. A similar provision for the colonies was more than thirty
years distant. SMITH, supra note 21, at 16 (referring to the Act of Frauds of 1696).
25 See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 21, at 53, 58 (citing 13 & 14 Char. II, ch. 11, § 5 (1662)
(Act of Charles II was first parliamentary authorization giving English Court of Excheq-
uer broad tax collection device); 7 & 8 Wm. III, ch. 22, § 6 (1696) (Act of William III
gave customs officers in America " 'the same powers and authorities' and the 'like assist-
ance' that officials had in England."); Prov. St. 11 Wm. III (1699) (provincial statute
giving Superior Court jurisdiction of English Courts of Exchequer, King's Bench, and
Common Pleas)). In the 17 60s, the colonists repeatedly contended that the statutes
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longed legal battle over their validity was purely a matter of statu-
tory construction. 26
The First Congress saw the need for legislative authorization.27
The first volume of Statutes at Large contained four separate acts,
each passed under the authority of the taxing power, each authoriz-
ing search warrants for daytime searches for and seizures of specific
types of property whose possession was illegal. 28 In the 1800s, Con-
gress continued to pitch its search and seizure laws at narrow classes
of conduct and property. For instance, an 1863 act permitted
search warrants for books and papers relating to customs fraud,29
while an 1894 act struck at the distribution of obscene or immoral
materials, contraceptives or abortion-inducing drugs, and lottery
tickets.3 0
Yet whether such statutory authority for the issuance of search
authorizing the writs were void as to them. Although the House of Commons ratified
the writs as late as 1767, the controversial seizure of John Hancock's sloop "Liberty,"
the emergence of the concept of "constitutionality," and Boston's publication of its "In-
fringements and Violations of Rights" sounded the death knell of the writs, and the
birth of revolution. LAssON, supra note 21, at 57-73.
26 LASSON, supra note 21, at 57-78.
27 This constraint operates on the local level as well. Long before the passage of the
Bill of Rights, two states said as much in their constitutions. Connecticut's Constitution
of 1776 stated, "no man's goods shall be taken away from him, unless clearly warranted
by the laws of this state." I BENJAMIN P. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONs 258
(1877); LAsSON, supra note 21, at 82 n.17. Four years later, Massachusetts required that
warrants issue "with the formalities, prescribed by the laws." See POORE, supra at 959;
LASSON, supra note 21, at 82 nn.15 & 17. A half-century later, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court observed that while their constitution prohibited unreasonable searches,
"[t]he legislature w[as] not deprived of the power to authorize search warrants for prob-
able causes." Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 336 (1841).
Much more recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this principle. See Grim-
mett v. State, 476 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1972). Recognizing that no such right existed under
the common law, which, like many states, Arkansas had incorporated into its own law, see
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 1-101 (1956), the court suppressed a physician's books and records
under a statute that did not authorize the particular invasion in question. See Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 82-2109 (1967). See also City of Shreveport v. Maroun, 64 So. 388 (La. 1914)
(issuance of warrant not authorized by law is an unreasonable search and seizure); State
ex rel King v. District Court, 224 P. 862 (Mont. 1924) (same); State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261
(W. Va. 1922) (same).
28 Act ofJuly 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43; Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48,
1 Stat. 145, 170; Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207; Act of March 2,
1799, ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677, repealed by Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 641, 42 Stat.
858, 989. See John Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CAL. L. REV. 474, 476-77, 476 n.16, 477 n.17 (1961).
29 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 7, 12 Stat. 737, 740, repealed by Act of March 2,
1867, ch. 188, § 2, 14 Stat. 546, 547, amended by Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 12, 18
Stat. 186, 188. The Court held the search provision unconstitutional in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
30 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 10 & 12, 28 Stat. 509, 549, repealed by Act of
July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 34, 30 Stat. 151, 213.
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warrants is an essential condition of their validity has never excited
much interest.31 The few sources that touch on the subject make
only conclusory references to a "self-executing" Fourth Amend-
ment,32 a blanket need for congressional authorization,33 and a mid-
dle ground, where searches and seizures are valid if they are
"declaratory of history or common law." 34 Although the absence of
thoughtful work on what authority must exist for searches and
seizures is remarkable, if legislation is an essential condition, it be-
came available in the Espionage Act of 1917. Before reviewing fac-
ets of that legislation, however, I turn to the key Supreme Court
decisions that preceded it, because this history highlights the
Court's rather loose approach to the question of where the govern-
ment gets its power to gather evidence of crime.
In 1886, the Court in Boyd v. United States3 5 held unconstitu-
tional a statute that forced Boyd to comply with a subpoena duces tecum
(lest the prosecutor's assertions about invoices named in the sub-
poena be taken as true). There the Court first defined the scope of
searches and seizures, and held that they were limited to quests for
"contraband" (possession of which the legislature has made crimi-
nal), and "fruits of crime" (because the government is acting in its
role as recoverer of victims' stolen property).36 Although the Court
31 E.g., Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361,
380 (1921); Charles M. Hough, Law in War Time, 31 HARV. L. REV. 692, 698 (1918)
("Title XI search warrants are authorized under many circumstances-a right long with-
held by Congress to the detriment of the public in many ways."); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Congress always has been chary
in allowing the use of search warrants.").
32 United States v. McHie, 194 F. 894, 897-98 (N.D. 11. 1912) ("The suggestion that
no federal statute authorizes a commissioner's warrant for the seizure of property used
in the abuse of the mails is without force since the constitutional provisions referred to
are self-executing.").
33 United States v. Jones, 230 F. 262, 266-70 (N.D.N.Y. 1916) (whether statutory
authority is required is "an important question," answered in the affirmative). See supra
note 27 (citing state supreme court decisions invalidating search warrants in absence of
statutory authorization); see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("Con-
gress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a house without a
warrant.").
34 See United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (a confusing opinion
in which court acknowledges that a New York statute "may be regarded as a special
grant of authority," but authority comes not from the state's procedural code, "but be-
cause it is declaratory of history or common law"). District Judge Alexander Holtzoff,
Secretary of the Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, stated that legislation "is not the exclusive source of existing law as to search and
seizure. Much of the law is common law, tradition, [and] decisions ...." 6 NEw YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 146
(1946) (discussing Rule 41 (b)).
35 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36 A fruit is the "end product ... of criminal activity" or, in a philosophical sense,
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purported merely to rely upon British practice, 37 a noticeable differ-
ence lay between the negative part of the Court's holding, which
invalidated the statute, and the affirmative part, which concluded
that government has a property interest in contraband and fruits of
crime.
Thus, when in 1904 the Court declared that the government's
right to issue a search warrant also extended to warrants to search
for the means of committing crimes, and claimed that this right was
"too long established to require discussion," 38 the Court's refusal to
substantiate its position was not enough to make it true.39 The
Court was correct in claiming that seizure of "instrumentalities"
boasted an impressive pedigree, and was justified by the need to bar
the tools of crime from further use.40 But no positive act of law then
"the final cause of the crime." Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo.
LJ. 593, 607 (1966). Typically, fruits are stolen goods. But see SIR EDWARD COKE,
FOURTH INsTrrUTE 176 (1797) (even stolen property cannot be seized). The word en-
compasses money and other material objects, including those objects purchased with
fruits.
37 Without any other guide as to what "unreasonable" meant, Boyd relied on an old
British civil case entitled Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). Commentators
have criticized the Court's reliance because Entick was a self-incrimination case, not a
search and seizure case. See, e.g., Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 694 (1961); Comment, Criminal Law: The
Mere Evidence Rule Discarded, 52 MINN. L. REV. 901, 902-03 (1968); Comment, Search,
Seizure, and the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments, 31 YALE LJ. 518, 521 (1922) (stating that
Justice Bradley's dovetailing of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Boyd amounted to
"dictum on a previous dictum of Lord Camden").
38 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904) (adding that "[t]he right of seizure
of lottery tickets and gambling devices, such as policy slips, under such warrants, re-
quires no argument to sustain it this day.").
39 See M.H. SMrrH, supra note 21.
40 The Government's right to seize and retain instruments of crime is traceable to
deodand (from the Latin Deo dandum-to be given to God), which entailed "the forfei-
ture of any object that caused the death of one of the King's subjects." Lawrence A.
Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil Forfeitures that Exceed Rough Remedial
Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194, 198 (1991). So, "a sword used to kill a person
... was ... forfeited to God, by way of the church." Id. Similarly, "if a bull gored a
person to death, the animal was declared a deodand, and was put to death." Id. at 198-
199. See also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) (discussing rejection
of deodand in colonies); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-83 (1974) (same); Kaplan, supra note 28, at 478 (finding it "difficult to believe" that
"metaphysical fault" on which 13th century fiction rested "has been frozen into our
Constitution"). But cf Henry C. McFadyen, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Law-Criminal
Law-The "Mere Evidence" Rule-Applicability to the States, 45 N.C. L. REV. 512, 514 (1967)
(suggesting vitality of deodand). An instrumentality is a tool of crime and escape. See,
e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (finding birth certificate was instrumen-
tality of crime of espionage because with it, one could pose as American citizen); United
States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.) (holding that shoes worn by defendant were in-
strumentalities because they "would facilitate a robber's getaway and would not attract
as much public attention as a robber fleeing barefoot from the scene of the holdup"),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958).
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ratified the search warrants for this type of evidence. Rather, the
extant authorizing legislation addressed only "fruits" and "contra-
band." Congressional, and soon after, more elaborate judicial4'
recognition of this third species of seizable property-instruments of
crime-did not occur until a decade later.
B. THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917
Congress drafted the Espionage Act of 1917 in part, "to better
enforce the criminal laws of the United States." 42 The Act de-
scribed Congress' view of seizable property at a high level of gener-
ality, leaving out the limiting references to specific chattels, such as
lottery tickets, 43 illicit liquors,44 and gambling paraphernalia45 that
characterized its previous search-and-seizure laws. Title XI of the
Act empowered federal courts to issue search warrants for "prop-
erty stolen or embezzled in violation of a law of the United States,"
or "used as a means of committing a felony."'4 6 Although the Act
41 Cf Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914) (Weeks does not involve
search incident to arrest for "fruits or evidences of crime," "nor is it the case of bur-
glar's tools or other proofs of guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the ac-
cused"); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) (explaining
ancient basis of power to seize fruits or tools of crime).
42 40 Stat. 217 (1917). The legislative history reveals Congress' intent to make the
Act one of "general applicability, and attempts to limit its provisions to espionage mat-
ters were rejected." Evidentiary Searches, supra note 36, at 602 n.50 (citing 55 CONG. REC.
1720, 1838-39 (1917)); U.S. Att'y Gen., Recommendations for Legislation Amending
the Criminal and Other Laws of the United States with Reference to Neutrality and For-
eign Relations 28-29 (1916); cf. Charles Cheney Hyde, The Espionage Act, 12 AM.J. INT'L.
L. 142 (1918) (explaining various aims of Act).
43 Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 16, 30 Stat. 151, 208.
44 Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207; Act of February 14, 1917, ch.
53, § 17, 39 Stat. 903, 906-907, repealed by Act of April 13, 1934, ch. 119, 48 Stat. 583.
45 Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 11, 36 Stat. 11, 86, repealed by Tariff Act of
1913, ch. 16, § IV(S), 38 Stat. 114, 201.
46 Espionage Act ofJune 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 217, 228. The third sec-
tion of Title XI authorized warrants for "property or any paper, [that] is possessed,
controlled, or used in violation of section twenty-two of this title," which punished ille-
gal possession of property or papers "in aid of any foreign Government." 40 Stat. at
230. See also Kaplan, supra note 28, at 477 & n.20. Congressman Webb noted that Title
XI "was based upon the New York law on this subject, and follow[ed] generally the
policy of that law." H.R. CONF. REp. No. 69, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1917). The New
York law was at the time "declared an embodiment of the historical doctrine." See
Fraenkel, supra note 31, at 380. The categories of property subject to seizure emerged
during the bill's refinement. H.R. CONy. REP. No. 30, 65th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1917),
required a recitation of "the property or papers sought," but said nothing about what
was meant by "property." Subsequent House and Senate reports contained language
identical to that which appeared in the law's final form. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 69,
65th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1917); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 65, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1917); S. CONF. REP. No. 44, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1917); S. CONF. REP. No. 37,
65th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1917).
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
did not mention contraband, the omission was deliberate, as dis-
crete statutes that declared possession of certain property to be ille-
gal also dictated how that property could be searched for and
seized.47
If ever the relationship between Congress and the Fourth
Amendment was provocative, it was during the 1917 floor debates
over Title XI.48 On May 4, the House debated the merits of Title
XI. At issue was the suggested amendment of Congressman George
Graham (R-Pa.), which would allow search warrants only "for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act"-to identify trai-
tors.49 Except where otherwise provided by the statutes of the
United States, Graham opposed "an unlimited power to issue a
search warrant in every case where the agencies of the Government
assume to exercise their power." 50
In response, Congressman William Stevenson (D-S.C.) asked:
"Where is there a statute of the United States providing for the issu-
ance of warrants except this?" 5' Congressman Edwin Webb (D-
N.C.), who favored the law's original version, answered by noting
that "[t]here are only a few cases where a search warrant can be
issued now under the laws of the United States."'52 Even Congress-
man Graham's home state, Webb continued, like all other states in
the Union, "has a very full and thorough law.., granting the right
to issue search warrants." 53 Why cannot the United States also, if
"carefully safeguarded," "have a general law... [to] aid... in the
detection of crime of whatever character it may be?" 54 After Gra-
ham insisted on his amendment, Webb read from a prepared state-
ment of Attorney General Thomas Gregory, 55 which summarized
the arguments in favor of a general search warrant provision:
[E]nforcement of the general Federal criminal laws [makes] some pro-
vision for the issue of search warrants ... imperatively necessary. At
47 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 618-20 (1946).
48 Members of the Senate anticipated the controversy on the eve of debate. Senators
Lee Overman (D-N.C.) and Albert Cummins (R-lowa) predicted that the "very impor-
tant subject matter" of the search provision would "cause a great deal of debate" be-
cause it was a "radical departure from all the legislation of the United States." See 55
CONG. REC. 1801 (1917).






55 Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren was the chief author of the espionage
bill. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1205, 1218 & n.47 (1983).
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present the issue of search warrants is practically authorized only in
statutes relative to customs and internal revenue. There are also a few
statutes authorizing searches in certain particular cases .... In gen-
eral, however, there is no provision for the issuance of a search war-
rant in the enforcement of the Federal criminal laws . . . . It is a
legitimate function of a search warrant to gain possession of such
property .... The court in the Adams case said: "The right to issue a
search warrant to discover stolen property or the means of committing
crime is too long established to require discussion." 56
Repulsed by all searches for private papers, Congressman Graham
continued to jab at Webb, until Webb responded that, so long as the
provision tracks the probable cause and particularity requirements
of the Fourth Amendment, "th[e] House ought to be willing to give
the Department of Justice power to detect and break up crime of
whatever nature against the United States."' 57 Nonetheless, Gra-
ham's amendment passed, by a seventy-one to forty-five margin.58
The next day the Senate debated the merits of Title XI, but
ignored the House's effort. The Senate drafted and inserted its own
bill instead, absent the restrictive Graham amendment.59 In discus-
sion mostly between Senators Thomas Walsh (D-Mt.) and Albert
Cummins (R-Ia.), the latter stressed his disapproval of the search
warrant provision. What bothered Cummins most was his percep-
tion that the statute would permit searches for evidence that was not
contraband, fruit, or instrumentality. 60 He relented, however, after
Senator Walsh answered that Title XI allowed searches only "for
property and for documents that have been used or are intended to
be used in the commission of crime." 6 1 After apologizing to the
Senate President for "protest[ing] against the legislation which
seems to be thought necessary by the administration," 6 2 Cummins
attached to the record a copy of the Boyd case, to which he implored
his colleagues to "pay some respect." 63
Senator Lawrence Sherman (R-Il.) took up the concerns of Gra-
56 55 CONG. REC. 1838 (1917).
57 Id. at 1839.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2067.
60 In response to a question from Senator Duncan Fletcher (D-Fla.), Cummins asked:
A search warrant is issued in a counterfeiting case and the counterfeiting tools are
seized in the possession of the person accused. They may be used as evidence for
whatsoever their possession will prove; but suppose the counterfeiter has in his
pocket a letter in which he admits that he has been guilty of the offense, and the
officer seizes the letter, does the Senator say it can be offered in evidence against
him or that it can be lawfully taken from his person?
Id. at 1854.
61 Id. at 1855.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1853.
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ham and Cummins, even more passionately. Like Graham, Sherman
would have accepted the warrant provision had it been limited to
searches for treasonous materials, especially in times of war.6r But,
as drafted, he feared the bill would, "under the guise of public peril,
... legislate in matters that are purely private and that are made for
the purpose of safeguarding persons and property in time of
peace." 65 When Senator Thomas Sterling (R-S.D.) pointed out that
search warrants currently could issue "by special statutes" in cases
involving obscene publications, gambling, and illegally sold liquor,
Sherman reiterated his willingness to add searches for evidence of
treason to that list,66 but nothing more.
At this point, Senator Walsh re-entered the debate to advise
Sherman that he wished only to give the federal government what
authority state legislators had given their law enforcers. 67 In re-
sponse, Sherman conveyed how he would feel were he to be the
victim of a search warrant for instruments of various crimes unre-
lated to the war power, among them an excise law requiring saloon
keepers to cancel the revenue stamp on open cigar boxes.68 Be-
cause the excise law in question had nothing to do with war, Sher-
man then said he would advise any client in violation of that law to
"load his firearms and shoot any United States Marshal who crosses
his threshold" to search his belongings. 69
To justify searches beyond those related to the war power, spe-
cifically the paper searches denounced in Boyd, Senator Walsh stated
(in error) that the warrant provision under consideration had been
proposed by Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma some two years
earlier,70 and never had its basis in the war power. Walsh saw no
64 Id. at 2065.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2065-66.
67 He also expressed concern about Sherman's apparent hearing disorder, which
Walsh feared would lead to a rehashing of old ground. Id. at 2066-67.
68 Id. at 2067.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2068. An extended search of the Congressional Record Index spanning the
10-year period prior to Senator Walsh's remark on the floor revealed no such proposal
by Senator Owen. However, various pieces of legislation enabling the federal govern-
ment to issue search warrants were before both Houses prior to 1917. In 1910, Senator
Clarence Clark (R-Wyo.) introduced S. 6566 "to authorize the issuance of search war-
rants for stolen or misappropriated property." 45 CONG. REc. 2065 (1910). The bill
died in Committee. In the House, Congressman Richard Parker (R-N.J.) introduced a
similar measure, H.R. 21338, on the same day. Id. at 2115. The House version survived
the Committee on theJudiciary, became H.R. REP. No. 1096, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1910), was debated on the floor, 45 CONG. REC. 7490-91 (1910), but never became law.
Parker introduced an identical measure in 1911, H.R. 30798, which was also unsuccess-
ful. See 46 CONG. REC. 642 (1911). In 1912 and 1914, Congressman Henry Clayton (D-
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problem with searches for evidence of nontreasonous crimes, view-
ing the Fourth Amendment's warrant strictures as a sufficient check
on overreaching federal officers. "The very paper [sought to be
seized]," he noted, "just like the very piece of property, must be
intended to be used in the commission of a crime." 71 So, despite
the efforts of Graham in the House, the Senate Bill, absent the trea-
son-only language, went to conference, was again rewritten, and be-
came law.7 2
The Espionage Act therefore did not generally authorize
searches for mere evidence, probably because Congress thought it
lacked the constitutional power to do so. 73 In fact, early versions of
the bill permitted warrants to issue for papers, but by the time the
bill reached its final form, warrants could reach only those papers
that qualified as fruits or instrumentalities. The one exception to
this restriction was for papers possessed with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy.
Months after the Act became law, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion urged Congress to expand the Act's warrant provision to en-
compass papers.74 The Commission earlier had failed in its
attempts to secure an examination of the papers of Swift & Com-
pany, which the Commission had accused of conspiring to fix prices
with four other meat packers. The Commission's plea to Congress
failed to produce a bill, but courts' imaginative interpretations of
fruits and instrumentalities achieved the Commission's desired end
for the next half-century, 75 until the Court and Congress officially
expanded the classes of evidence that could be searched for and
seized.
Ala.) introduced H.R. 22762 and H.R. 16474, bills to authorize and regulate the issu-
ance of search warrants for "property belonging to the United States." See 48 CONG.
REC. 4227 (1912); 51 CONG. REC. 8481 (1914). These also failed. Finally, in 1916, Sen-
ator Charles Culberson (D-Tex.) introduced S. 6819, 53 CONG. REC. 12411 (1916), the
text of which was read into the Record as Chapter XIV of S. 8148, an early version of the
legislation that was to become the Espionage Act of 1917. 54 CONG. REc. 3422 (1916).
71 55 CONG. REC. 2068 (1917).
72 See Brief for Respondent at 56-57, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)
(No. 250).
73 Cf Fraenkel, supra note 3 1, at 380.
74 SPECIAL REPORT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SUBMIrING RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION, H.R. Doc. No. 961, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1918).
75 See, e.g., Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.) (corpse, blood, and
objects with blood stains on them are fruits of the crime of murder), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
858 (1968); United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961) (rejecting prosecu-
tion's claim that perpetrator's written, lurid account of brutal sex crime was fruit be-
cause of satisfaction it produced for its writer).
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C. FROM GOULED TO HAYDEN: EVIDENTIARY SEARCHES, THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE REVISED TITLE 18
Four years after the Espionage Act became law, the Court con-
firmed that to search for and seize "mere evidence" was unconstitu-
tional. In Gouled v. United States,76 Felix Gouled bribed Army
purchasing agents into awarding him a lucrative raincoat manufac-
turing contract. 77 At his federal fraud trial, the United States sought
to introduce, inter alia, three papers seized by warrants issued under
the Espionage Act. Prosecutors alleged that an unexecuted form
contract between Gouled and a nonparty (Steinthal), a written con-
tract between Gouled and another nonparty (Lavinsky), and a bill to
Gouled for services from an acquitted private lawyer (Podell), were
instruments of crime and therefore admissible.
In language that became the crux of the mere-evidence rule, the
Court relied on Boyd in affirming that search warrants
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or
office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure
evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but
that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the com-
plainant may have in the property to be seized, or the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property of the accused unlawful and provides that it
may be taken. 78
Papers falling within these principles, said the Court, would receive
no special sanctity. A contract between Gouled and the United
States could have been an instrument of crime, which the govern-
ment could seize to protect the public from further frauds.79 But
apparently feeling bound by the lower court's failure to so describe
the contracts, the Court deemed the papers inadmissible.
Promptly after the decision, law professor Zechariah Chafee of-
fered the following insight:
Unfortunately, the form in which the case was certified to the Supreme
Court makes it impossible to limit the decision to the sensible proposi-
tion of statutory construction, that Congress had not as yet authorized
the seizure of purely evidentiary material. The decision necessarily
holds that such a seizure violates the Constitution, so that Congress
76 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
77 Name Army Officers in Raincoat Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1918, at 3; Captain
Indicted in Raincoat Fraud, N.Y. TiMES, July 31, 1918, at 7.
78 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24
(1886)).
79 Id. at 310-11.
19931
DANIEL B. YEAGER
cannot authorize it hereafter, even with a search warrant.80
Chafee referred to the Second Circuit's six certified questions,
8
'
which appeared in Gouled's brief. None asked the Court to con-
sider the scope of the Espionage Act, but four went to the scope of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The form of the certified ques-
tions thus may explain why the Court in Gouled ignored that identi-
fying the objects of search and seizure is first a legislative
responsibility; yet it does not explain why the Court since Gouled
continued to ignore this crucial condition.
Together, the Espionage Act, Boyd, and Gouled led to Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, with few excep-
tions, tracks the Court's view of the Fourth Amendment. 8 2 In 1968,
Congress, "which can move more quickly than the rulemaking appa-
ratus," amended a search-and-seizure provision of Title 18 in re-
sponse to the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,8 3 which had
loosened the Fourth Amendment limits on seizeable property.8 4
Because the Court cannot create property rights,8 5 Congress had to
80 Zechariah Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 699
(1922).
81 See Sup. Ct. R. 19; 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1988).
82 The Federal Rules were the result of enabling legislation passed on June 29, 1940
"[t]o give the Supreme Court... authority to prescribe rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure with respect to proceedings in criminal cases." Enabling Act, ch. 445, 54
Stat. 688 (1940) (originally codified in 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1940)). The Rules became ef-
fective by order of the Court on March 21, 1946, see Order of February 8, 1946, 327 U.S.
825 (1945), and were codified in the revised Title 18 of the United States Code on June
25, 1948, which, in turn, repealed Title XI of the Espionage Act. Act ofJune 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948) ("To revise, codify and enact into positive law, Title 18 of
the United States Code."). What had been 18 U.S.C. §§ 611-33 (1917), became the
Federal Rules which, in turn, became 18 U.S.C. §§ 3101-16 (1948). The revised Title 18
also presented a revised version of the 1940 enabling statute. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch.
645, 62 Stat. 683, 846 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1948)). In 1988, Congress re-
pealed § 3771 and replaced it with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1988), designed to "increase
participation in [the rulemaking] process by all segments of the bench and bar." See
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV,
§ 404(a)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988).
83 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (1988), added by Act ofJune 19,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. IX, § 1401(a), 82 Stat. 197, 238 (recognizing the Court's
abrogation of the mere evidence rule).
84 3 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 664 (2d ed. 1982). Since then, the Federal Rules Committee has amended the
search-and-seizure rules in 1972, 1977, 1979, and 1989, each time in step with the
Court's precedents, and disclaiming any impact or opinion on the exclusionary rule. Its
scope is left to the Court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) originally enumerated grounds of
exclusion which later versions of the Rules did not. See 6 NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 68-69, 146-48 (1946); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(e) advisory committee's notes (1989).
85 Some cases flout this assertion. One involved a professional photographer who
organized an outing to permit, for a fee, other photographers to take pictures of models,
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amend Title 18 to grant the government the right to search for and
seize the mere evidence that the Court's new decision addressed.
To wait for the Rules Committee to amend the Rules would have
meant a lengthy interim during which law enforcement could not
take advantage of the more relaxed limits.8 6 Four years after Con-
gress acted, the Rules were amended8 7 to comport with the Court
and Congress' understanding of the matter.
Because of its timing and its content, Warden v. Hayden88 de-
serves close analysis. The timing was critical because it preceded
Katz v. United States8 9 by only one term and contributed significantly
to that bombshell. The content was important for its attempt to use
history to free the Fourth Amendment from the fetters of property
law. Described by Charles Alan Wright as "strong," 90 Justice Bren-
nan's opinion for the 8-1 majority9 is on the whole unconvincing,
some of whom posed nude, in a rustic setting. He pleaded guilty to the crime of "out-
raging public decency" and paid his fine. When he sued to recover the admission of the
fees that the sheriff had confiscated upon arrest, the New York Court of Appeals refused
to entertain the action, despite the sheriff's lack of statutory justification or colorable
claim to the money. The court refused to grant relief "to one who would prove his
wrongdoing as a basis of his supposed rights." Carr v. Hoy, 139 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y.
1957). R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (1986) (calling Carr either "wrongly decided" or "prudish").
86 The following exchange took place between one of Katz's attorneys and the Court:
MR. SCHNEIDER: ... The Court, in the majority opinion in Hayden-
THE COURT: In which case?
MR. SCHNEIDER: In Hayden, Your Honor.
-stated that Rule 41 followed the Gouled decision and incorporated the test of
Gouled. It also.., indicates that 41 is a limitation ... on the enforcement officers to
their warrant, under a situation where mere evidence-only or exclusively-is
sought, or in addition. We think that the Congress has the right to make a statute,
or a Rule as in this case, more restrictive than that which is minimally required by
this Court.
THE COURT: This is not a constitutional argument. This is just that there is pres-
ently no federal law which authorizes the seizure of mere evidence, although we've
now said that, as a constitutional matter-
MR. SCHNEIDER: -it's permissible.
THE COURT: -it's permissible.
MR. SCHNEIDER: Unless there is another legislative enactment, I think that 41
still is the law.
See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 4, at 114.
87 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1972) ("Subdivision (b) is also
changed to modernize the language used to describe the property which may be seized
with a lawfully issued search warrant and to take account of a recent Supreme Court
decision.., and recent congressional action... which authorize the issuance of a search
warrant to search for items of solely evidential value.").
88 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
89 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
90 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 84, at 607.
91 Justice Fortas and ChiefJustice Warren concurred, but only because the evidence
was obtained in "hot pursuit" and determined Hayden's identity. Justice Douglas dis-
sented on the ground that the seizure of mere evidence violated Hayden's right to pri-
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and, in saying far more than necessary, ultimately has done more
harm than good to the goal to which it granted primacy.
Hayden robbed a taxicab company and fled on foot. A driver
saw him and noted his race, size, and clothing, then saw Hayden
enter his house, to which police were summoned. Several police of-
ficers lawfully entered in hot pursuit, and discovered Hayden in bed
feigning sleep. Strewn about the house were weapons, ammunition,
and clothing that matched a witness' description of those worn by
the robber. Hayden sought to suppress the clothing because it was
mere evidence of crime, and thus barred by Gouled. The Court
granted certiorari to settle the constitutionality of searches for and
seizures of purely evidentiary materials. 92
The kernel of Justice Brennan's opinion is his rejection of
Gouled's long-held "primary-right" theory, under which government
and search victim would compete over whose interest in the prop-
erty seized was superior. If government had the superior interest,
then government could admit the property at trial and retain it af-
terwards. If the search victim had the superior interest, then she
could repossess the property before trial and thereby effect its
exclusion.
In Justice Brennan's view, the primary-right theory had lost
much of its force in 1914, when the remedial structure of the Fourth
Amendment began to change from a Lockeian, property-based
model, to one based on privacy. Until then, aggrieved persons ob-
tained redress for illegal searches by trespass and replevin actions,
which were dependent on proof of a superior property interest, but
unrelated to how government obtained the property. 93 This struc-
ture, Brennan continued, had since been discredited by the emer-
gence of the privacy model, which changed both the meaning and
the consequences of governmental illegality.94 Therefore, to de-
clare a search unreasonable now means that the evidence so derived
is inadmissible at the search victim's trial, even absent the right to
vacy. Cf Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
MIcH. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1983) ("In my view, no reasonable method of constitutional
adjudication supports Justice Douglas' conclusion.").
92 Only a year earlier, the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
which clearly favored scientific investigative techniques over bullying. The mere evi-
dence rule, which could impair scientific discovery of a suspect's identity, could restrict
the use of a scientific approach to police investigations. See Note, 32 ALB. L. REV. 229,
236 (1967); Howard P. Roy, Note, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 452, 456-57 (1967); Robert A.
Kelly, Recent Decision, 6 Dug. L. REV. 60, 65 (1967-68); McFadyen, supra note 40, at
518 (citing Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647, 658 (4th Cir. 1966)).
93 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303-05.
94 Id. at 305-06.
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repossess it, as with contraband. Conversely, the government can
introduce evidence at trial even absent a superior interest, as with
goods stolen from an unidentified victim. 95
This shift in remedy, Brennan wrote, ended the contest over
property interests. For example, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,96 a father and son who ran a lumber yard had conspired to
charge a government-controlled railroad for boards not received. 97
They could not replevy their property during trial because the ob-
jectionable evidence included copies of documents that defendants
had possessed legally, and not the illegally seized documents them-
selves.98 Nonetheless, the Court prohibited the United States from
introducing the copies at trial, not on the ground that the copies
were the defendants' intellectual property, but because the govern-
ment must not profit from its own wrong.99 Likewise, a year later
Felix Gouled successfully prohibited the United States from using
papers of evidentiary value only, even though he had lost his pretrial
motion for return of the papers.' 00 Since defendants in both cases
achieved the chief thing desired' 0 ' without successfully asserting a
superior property right in the object seized, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the suppression remedy had crowded property law out
of the Fourth Amendment limelight.
Brennan did acknowledge some governmental interest in stolen
propertym-the fruits of crime-and how the government's interest
had "gradually extended" to contraband and instrumentalities.10 2
But there are reasons for each extension, he asserted, that have
nothing to do with property law. The right to search for and seize
stolen property originally involved the government's acting on be-
95 Id. at 307 n.ll.
96 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
97 Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs-in-Error at 4, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (No. 358).
98 Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 391. The decision reversed a trial judge's con-
tempt charge issued against defendants for their failure to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum for records, which were illegally seized, then returned. Holmes said nothing di-
rectly about copies the Government had made of the records, except that illegally ob-
tained evidence should not be used at all. The illegal search and seizure occurred when
officers, carrying only a subpoena, "stripped [the company office] of all its books, papers
and documents and carried them away." Plaintiff's Brief at 4, Silverthorne Lumber Co.
(1920) (No. 358). The subpoena was overbroad, and, of course, carried with it no right
of entry. Seven federal marshals executed the subpoena while the Silverthornes were
elsewhere being arrested and admitted to bail. Id. at 4-5.
99 Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
100 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
101 See Thomas E. Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH. L.
REv. 748, 758 (1924).
102 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303.
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half of an identified victim of theft.' 03 Now that the identity of the
theft victim no longer is required to authorize a search, government
still can obtain the property, based on the "separate governmental
interest in seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals."10 4
This, in Brennan's view, meant that government asserts no property
interest in the stolen goods. As for instruments of crime, he contin-
ued, they are seizable and nonreturnable not because of the govern-
ment's property interest in them, but to prevent their being used to
perpetrate further crime.10 5 Mere evidence, he added, can be seized
on the same ground, since identifying criminals is as important as
seizing the instruments of crime. 10 6 Contraband, Brennan con-
ceded, involves a superior governmental interest, but only because
the government creates that interest. That interest is not in prop-
erty, he insisted, but is "hardly more than a form through which the
Government seeks to prevent and deter crime."' 10 7
Justice Brennan's thesis-that the Fourth Amendment has put
property law out to pasture-rests on two points: 1) the govern-
ment's interest in searching for and seizing evidence of crime is not
a property interest, but some other type of interest; and 2) the shift
in aggrieved parties' remedies has subordinated a defendant's inter-
est in repossession to suppression. I will address each observation
in turn.
When Justice Brennan and others10 8 say that government's in-
103 Id. at 307 n.l1.
104 Id. at 303.
105 For decades, the Court struggled openly with the meaning of "instrumentality."
See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 4, at 115 (During oral argument in Katz, Katz's attor-
ney, Harvey Schneider, said: "I don't mean to make light of the situation-but if he
dials the telephone with his index finger, then the Government's entitled to an amputa-
tion. I don't think that's the law.").
106 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307 n.1 1.
107 Id.
108 E.g., Criminal Law: The Mere Evidence Rule Discarded, supra note 37, at 905
("[O]bjects are generally not sought or seized to vindicate a property right, but rather to
aid in proving the guilt of the accused."); Note, 32 ALB. L. REV. 229, 235 (1967) (slew of
exceptions to rule resulted from tension between purpose of rule-to protect against
assertions of other-than-superior property rights-and purpose of Fourth Amendment,
which has "long been to enable the police to obtain information to prevent and prose-
cute crime"); Recent Cases, Criminal Law: The "Mere Evidence" Rule Is Expressly Abolished,
20 VAND. L. REV. 1350, 1354 (1967) (endorsing abolishment of rule not only because
courts could call almost any evidence an "instrumentality," but also because the rule
"served as nothing more than an illogical impediment to the gathering and use of rele-
vant evidence"); Evidentiary Searches, supra note 36, at 622-23 (Fourth Amendment
should not turn on property-based theory, but Fifth Amendment may); Comment, Limi-
tations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHm. L. REV.
319, 323-24 (1953) ("The title rationale, however, is insufficient to explain the seizure of
weapons used to commit a crime and of required records."); Yale Kamisar, Public Safety
v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
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terest in certain types of property is "hardly more than a form
through which the Government seeks to prevent and deter crime,"
that "form" is a property interest. Congress created that interest 09
under the authority of Article I, limited by the takings, 110 due pro-
cess,I1 I and, as here, search and seizure' 12 clauses. Because there is
no general forfeiture statute, a variety of federal laws transfer title to
property from classes of wrongdoers to the United States." t3 These
laws, scattered throughout the United States Code, empower fed-
eral courts to order evidence delivered to the permanent custody of
various agencies. 1 4 They define property forfeitable to the United
States narrowly, e.g., firearms used in violent felonies, 115 and
broadly, e.g., fruits or instrumentalities of money laundering," l6
drug," 17 or racketeering offenses." 18 Absent such a statute, a court's
Scr. 171, 177 (1962); Kaplan, supra note 28, at 478; RogerJ. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at
Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE LJ. 319, 330.
109 Cf Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 739 (1964) ("Property...
is the creation of law."); id. at 771 ("Property is not a natural right but a deliberate
construction by society.").
110 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
II Id.
112 U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
113 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) (forfeiture to government of property in interstate
commerce derived from violation of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1177, 1955(a) (1988)
(property used in connection with illegal gambling); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (property
used in connection with violation of RICO); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1988) (adulterated or mis-
branded food, drugs, or cosmetics); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988) (forfeiture of property con-
nected to tax avoidance); I David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases
(MB) § 2.03 (1985); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE: COMPILATION OF CIVIL
STArmTs 319-32 (1987) (listing 138 statutory forfeiture provisions, the property forfeit-
able, and the underlying offense triggering forfeiture).
114 See M.H. SMrrH, supra note 21, at 12 & n.5 (From the year 1275 A.D. on, "customs
forfeiture was invariably a matter of specific statutory enactment.").
IT]he prominent targets for forfeiture are assets used by those who engage in drug
trafficking and narcotics use. But the breadth of state and federal forfeiture statutes
permit the seizure of property acquired in violation of antitrust laws, property used
for illegal gambling, vehicles used in violation of liquor laws, guns or other equip-
ment used unlawfully in national parks, and property smuggled in violation of cus-
toms laws. Many states have generated forfeiture statutes that permit the seizure of
virtually any property used as an instrumentality of a crime.
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objec-
tives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1325, 1339 (1991).
115 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1988).
116 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988).
117 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (in personam action part and parcel of sentence for drug
offenses provides for forfeiture of proceeds and property connected to narcotics trans-
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (government may proceed in rem against property that
merely may have been involved in an illegal drug transaction). Under § 881, the govern-
ment need only prove that there is probable cause to believe the property is subject to
forfeiture. In the forfeiture context, probable cause has been interpreted as a "reason-
able ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than
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refusal to return the property to the search victim would be an un-
reasonable seizure." 9
What interest has Congress given government with regard to
searches and seizures? More specifically, what interest does govern-
ment assert when it seizes evidence for presentation at trial? The
answer must be a property interest, insofar as when government
takes possession of property pursuant to a proper search and
seizure, its possession cannot be disturbed; its dominion is deemed
to be exclusive. 120 I see no other way to describe that exclusive pos-
session than as an interest in property. 12 1
Even Blackstone's rigid definition of property fits our needs.
For him, property is "that sole and despotic dominion which one...
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
mere suspicion." Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfei-
ture Under the Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 474 & n.25
(1989) (quoting United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th
Cir. 1980)). Many procedural protections afforded criminal defendants do not apply in
civil actions, nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
54(b). To facilitate the transfer of properties involved in drug transactions, Congress
has back-dated the United States' title to the date of the illegal transaction, thus avoiding
the Government's being thwarted by preferential transfers.
118 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
119 That refusal may also constitute an uncompensated "taking" within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 618-20 (1946) (lists federal statutes au-
thorizing seizure of contraband, which under no circumstances may search victim repos-
sess).
As a condition precedent to forfeiture, valid searches and seizures facilitate the
perfection of the government's title where the forfeiture laws allow. Even when the
government plans no criminal prosecution, seizures for purposes of civil forfeiture must
obey the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. One Hundred Twenty-Eight Thou-
sand Thirty Five Dollars ($128,035.00) in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (civil forfeiture is quasi-criminal in nature, so procedural protections attach);
Douglas Clark Hollmann, Forfeitures and the Fourth Amendment, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 20
(198 1) ("Acts of Congress cannot authorize a search or seizure which violates the Fourth
Amendment; accordingly, the Fourth Amendment applies to a seizure for forfeiture.").
Id. at 3 (citing United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 405 (1814)).
121 I am indebted to the work of Professor Fernand Dutile, who, in his short piece in
the 1971 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, suggested that Hayden would have made
much more sense had it retained the superior-interest theory, "but should have ex-
tended it to include the right to possession for whatever period of time the course of
prosecution makes necessary." Fernand N. Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court 's
Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 24
(1971). Dutile's insights into the formal relationship between the government and the
evidence seized were timely and thoughtful. While I am not altogether sure that he
fulfilled his stated promise to "assess the true role of the property concept in delimiting
the scope of the amendment," id. at 3, his work must be acknowledged for its apprecia-
tion of Katz's cumulative rather than substitutional role in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Id. at 30-31.
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exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."'' 22
Neither Blackstone, nor any other commentator or court requires
that the interest be perpetual. As Professor Joseph Singer has ob-
served, "[m]uch of the first-year property course in law schools is
devoted to examining ways in which property interests can be
shared or divided up."'123 There is nothing exotic about Congress'
vesting law enforcement with a temporary (for trial purposes) and
potentially permanent (upon forfeiture) possession of property.
When describing lawfully seized property, few would dispute
that the government has a right to exclusive possession. If a defend-
ant were to be acquitted on the merits, few would hesitate to say,
"the defendant gets to keep her property." All possession is lawful
only until the legislature says that a superior interest rests in the
government, either forever, or for the course of the litigation.124
However weak the government's title may be before trial-as with
instrumentalities 25 and mere evidence-that interest is perfected
on judgment of conviction and forfeiture or escheat. 126 In property
terminology, the search victim holds the property in fee, subject to
partial divestment upon the onset of criminal proceedings, and total
divestment if noncontraband evidence is lawfully seized, admitted,
122 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
123 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 637
(1988). In Singer's view, it would be "nonsense" to conclude that the image of one with
a property right is only one of a "single 'owner"' "with ultimate control over the dispo-
sition of a thing." Id. (citing Kenneth Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980)).
Property rights can be divided in various ways, including: 1) over time; 2) into co-own-
ership; 3) into leases; 4) into trusts; 5) into easements and covenants; and 6) into mort-
gages. Id. at 638.
124 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) advisory committee's note (1989) (return of property
judged by "reasonableness under all of the circumstances," and if "need" on part of
United States is "investigation or prosecution, its retention of the property generally is
reasonable").
125 Instrumentalities pose a different case than do fruits or contraband because, un-
like the latter, "where defendant's title is minimal at best," "it is usually the case that
mere possession of [instrumentalities] is perfectly lawful." Evidentiay Searches, supra note
36, at 622 n.190 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (ledger and bills
obtained during search of saloon/casino for illicit liquor were "part of the outfit or
equipment actually used to commit the offense.")). Likewise, some instrumentalities,
like a cancelled check, cannot be used in crime again and certainly pose no danger to the
public or the searching officers. McFadyen, supra note 40, at 515.
126 Escheat is a right originating in both the royal prerogative and on the feudal con-
cept of tenure. The lands of tenants who committed high treason were forfeited to the
Crown, and for all other felonies (or serious breaches of the feudal bond), the felon or
breacher's lands returned to the Lord. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 21-22, 21 n.4 (1962); Kasten, supra note 40, at 197, 198 nn.20-
23. In all states there are statutes vesting in the state (or a political subdivision thereof)
title to lands of a person who dies intestate and without heirs. MOYNIHAN, supra at 27.
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and forfeited by conviction. The government's interest is contin-
gent or temporary, as are many property interests, none of which we
call "a mere form," except insofar as property is a "form" that re-
lates interest-holder to interest described. 127 While the "primary
purpose of search is to secure evidence,"' 28 and "government has
an interest in solving crime,"' 29 legislatively created, governmental
interests in property serve those ends.' 30 By any other name, such
legislation commands that the rightful possessor end up with the
property.13 '
D. THE SHIFT IN THE PRIMARY FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDY
1. Repossession: Rule 41(e) and its Antecedents
The Government's interest in lawfully seized property is supe-
rior until the conclusion of the trial, or so long as is reasonable.
Federal Rule 41(e) states in pertinent part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the depri-
vation of property may move the district court for the district in which
the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground
that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property .... If
the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant,
although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and
use of the property in subsequent proceedings.13 2
127 See also Reich, supra note 109, at 778-79 ("[A]I property might be described as
government largess, given on condition and subject to loss.").
128 McFadyen, supra note 40, at 515 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239
(1960)).
129 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306.
130 Cf Reich, supra note 109, at 778 ("Personal property is created by law; it owes its
origin and continuance to laws supported by the people as a whole. These laws 'give'
the property to one who performs certain actions.").
131 Cf In re Marx, 255 F. 344, 345 (N.D. Cal. 1918) (rejecting fiction that illegally
seized papers belong to the United States, and holding that court-held papers so seized
should be restored "to that possession from which they never should have been taken").
This is not the case, of course, with contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Rykowski, 267
F. 866, 870 (S.D. Ohio 1920) (liquor stills not restored to defendant).
132 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) remains important to search victims, whether or not they
are suspects. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (Hayden permits war-
rant for search of student newspaper for photographs that could help identify demon-
strators who had fought with police, so long as there is a nexus between the sought item
and a crime). Eleven years after the decision, the amended 41(e) made clear that one
need not be the victim of an unlawful search in order to obtain return of evidence law-
fully possessed. The victim of a lawful search is an "aggrieved" party within the mean-
ing of the Rule if the Government retains the evidence for an unreasonably long time.
Generally, however, an ongoing investigation or prosecution is reason enough. The
Advisory Committee expressly rejected "an all or nothing approach whereby the gov-
ernment must either return records and make no copies or keep originals notwithstand-
ing the hardship to their owner." The Committee also declined to make ex ante choices
between retention. return with conditions that the evidence remain available, and
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A trial court's alleged error in denying the motion for return of
property is regarded as the denial of a constitutional right, not a
property right. As such, the right does not depend on statutory au-
thorization.' 33 Still, authorization has existed since the Espionage
Act, which permitted the fruits of unreasonable searches to be re-
turned to the search victim. 1 34 When the Federal Rules and, soon
after, Congress, codified the Espionage Act's search warrant provi-
sions, Rule 41(e) became law in the federal district courts.
At first, the repossession remedy was a civil proceeding wholly
independent of the criminal action for which the property was being
held as evidence.135 The guilt or innocence of the movant was irrel-
evant in the repossession proceeding, 136 and was not made part of
the record or subject to appellate review of the criminal case. The
Supreme Court changed all this through two 1911 decisions' 37 and,
more noticeably, through its 1914 decision in Weeks v. United
States.138 There, the Court held that the denial of Fremont Weeks'
application for return of his illegally obtained property could, if
challenged by a timely preliminary motion, 139 be included in the ap-
whether to retain or destroy copies. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) advisory committee's
note (1989).
The same amendment to the Rule clarified that repossession and suppression are
separate remedies: a successful motion for return of property will not necessarily dictate
a successful motion to suppress. Id.
133 Atkinson, supra note 101, at 759.
134 Id. The Volstead Law, 41 Stat. 315 (1915), Congress' attempt to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment, also permitted return of property obtained by illegal search.
Id.
135 People v. Mayen, 205 P. 435, 441 (Cal. 1922).
136 One commentator surveyed civil and criminal cases where wrongful possessors
attempted to rely on the hornbook law that "possession of a chattel, even without claim
of title, gives the possessor a superior right to the chattel against everyone but the true
owner." Helmholz, supra note 85, at 1221. Helmholz contended the moral worth of the
possessor seeking to replevy subsequently wrongfully acquired property is always rele-
vant to reviewing courts, despite what the hornbooks say. Id. at 1223.
137 BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL
HISTORY 65 (1986) (citing Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. 549 (1911) and Wise v. Henkel, 220
U.S. 556 (1911)). "The first reported instance of a motion made before trial asking the
court to return papers on the ground that they had been illegally seized was in 1908 in
United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908)." Id. at 65 n.93.
138 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks was running an illegal lottery enterprise through the
United States mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 213 (1913).
139 Id. at 398. Courts avoid deciding collateral issues at trial whenever possible, upon
the theory that the court's and jury's time and attention should remain with the primary
issues. Atkinson, supra note 101, at 751. Much to the chagrin of Dean Wigmore, the
Court in the Weeks case found a way to avoid the difficulty of raising a collateral issue at
the trial: by pretrial motion. See John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 481 (1922) (Weeks is a "heretical" decision which ig-
nores that "a defendant cannot turn a collateral fact into a material fact by merely mak-
ing a formal motion before trial, instead of waiting till the offer of evidence.").
DANIEL B. YEAGER
pellate review of his criminal conviction.
Although Weeks was limited to interference with valid posses-
sory rights, 140 that had slight influence on lower courts subse-
quently faced with contraband illegally searched for and seized.
Some courts admitted the evidence and the government retained it
after trial; some courts suppressed the evidence but permitted the
government to retain or destroy it; other courts opted for suppres-
sion and return. 14 1 Although at first glance the range of options
suggests that the courts were creating property interests, in fact they
were interpreting statutes that had stripped possessors of any prop-
erty interest in the thing possessed, but had not stipulated what to
do with that evidence after trial. 142
2. Repossession versus Suppression
Cases like Weeks, Silverthorne, and Gouled show that suppression
is not ancillary to or derivative of restoration of the property, 143 par-
ticularly when the only property right available is the prior illegal
possession of contraband or stolen property. 144 Although suppres-
sion has eclipsed repossession as the chief remedy sought by crimi-
nal defendants, and while neither remedy is dependent on the
other, they are complementary. 145 Both protect property and pri-
vacy. 146 This conclusion is easy once we recognize that most war-
rantless interferences with privacy interfere with possession of
property, real or personal.
To emphasize suppression over repossession in the hierarchy of
Fourth Amendment remedies misstates what property law means to
140 WILSON, supra note 137, at 64.
141 Atkinson, supra note 101, at 760-61.
142 Cf id. at 763-64 (Forfeiture laws that purport to eliminate any property rights in
contraband are not fatal to repossession, since possession, unlike ownership, "is a fact
and cannot be altered by legislative fiat any more than day can be changed into night by
the same method.").
143 id. at 760-61, 761 nn.50-51. See also William T. Plumb,Jr., Illegal Enforcement of the
Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 365-66 (1939).
144 See Helmholz, supra note 85, at 1224. Professor Helmholz's survey of the prior-
possessor rule indicates that prior possessors who are also wrongdoers fare poorly, not
only because civil contests between two wrongdoers are rare, but because the rule's
amorality is unattractive to courts faced with parties of starkly unequal moral content.
145 The Federal Rules treat all post-indictment motions for return of property as mo-
tions to suppress as well. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
146 In fact, if the motion for return of property is granted not on the basis of a prop-
erty right but on an unreasonable infringement of privacy, then the returm of contra-
band, as well as the suppression of the evidence obtained by unconstitutional search, is
justified. To do otherwise is to encourage illegal searches and seizures aimed not at




the Amendment. A search victim who obtains suppression but not
return of the property has obtained a remedy despite the govern-
ment's superior interest in the property.147 The reason the govern-
ment cannot use the evidence in such a case is that it went about
asserting its interest unlawfully, much as a victim of trespass must
pay damages to her intruder if the victim's manner of ejection ex-
ceeds those legally prescribed. When government acts unlawfully,
one incident of rightful possession-admissibility-is lost. There,
the prior wrongful possessor (the search victim) can rely on prior
possession to effect exclusion. So too, when government lawfully
searches for and seizes evidence in the defendant's possession, it
receives the full panoply of rights that a superior, even if temporary,
possessory interest confers, including admissibility at trial.
Once a criminal prosecution runs its course, the rightful posses-
sor will end up with the property. When, by statute, the govern-
ment takes title to seized property regardless of how it was acquired
(as with contraband), who ultimately gets the property is irrelevant
to the outcome of the trial. When, by statute, the government's in-
terest in the seized property is at first only temporary (as with fruits,
instrumentalities, and mere evidence), that interest becomes perma-
nent only after favorable rulings on the lawfulness of the seizure and
the issue of guilt.
In sum, law enforcers may take property because a legislature
lets them.148 The legislature, in turn, must conform to the Court's
constitutional norms. Thus Brennan's dismissal of property law's
role in the Fourth Amendment-both in terms of the distribution of
power in our tripartite form of government, and in terms of rem-
edy-is overstated and underappreciative of the resilience of the
"primary right" theory.
Once the Court distinguished property constructs from the evi-
dence-gathering and remedial functions of search and seizure law,
the recalibration of the Fourth Amendment was nearly complete. It
needed only a new foundation, a new primary good; it needed pri-
vacy. Part II considers the Court's claim that privacy dethroned
147 Cf Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 545 n.1 (1977) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("A dictabelt tape or diary may be 'private'... in the sense that the
Fourth Amendment would prohibit an unreasonable seizure of it even though in making
such a seizure the government agreed to pay for the fair value of the diary so as not to
run afoul of the Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
148 This is not to say that every action taken by police must have statutory support in
order to be constitutional. Much warrantless police conduct occurs without specific au-
thorization, be it legislative or judicial. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Improving Police Per-
formance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part II: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30
Mo. L. REv. 566 (1965).
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property, and argues that the new regime resulted solely from a
false dichotomy drawn between compatible values.
II. PRIVACY: A PROTECTED VALUE FROM THE START
Justice Brennan was correct in Hayden when he wrote that pri-
vacy has long been a Fourth Amendment value. Over 100 years ago
in Boyd (an appeal from a court order compelling Boyd to produce
invoices for imported glass), privacy played a role. To be sure, Boyd
exalted property rights as "the great end for which men entered
into society."' 49 But also amongJustice Bradley's many references
to "private property," "personal security," and "liberty" was his in-
sistence that the Court guard against "all invasions on the part of
the government ... of... the privacies of life."' 150 Together, these
were the "true criteria" of the Amendment.151
Boyd's "privacies of life" and equivalent language later ap-
peared in the majority opinions of Harlan the Elder 15 2 and Justice
Day,155 and throughout Prohibition. Privacy played a part when the
Court invalidated the search-by-stealth of Felix Gouled's office,'
54
and two overreaching searches incident to arrest for Agnello's co-
caine' 55 and Lefkowitz's liquor. 156 In between Agnello and Lefkowitz,
149 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)). See also Walton H. Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41
YALE LJ. 864, 873-74 (1932).
150 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also Coombs, supra note 3, at 1606-07 ("[Although]
Fourth Amendment analysis traditionally began by determining whether any property
right had been infringed ... the use of property concepts to mark the boundaries of
Fourth Amendment protection did not mean that privacy interests were irrelevant.").
151 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
152 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-79 (1894) ("Neither
branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, estab-
lished by [C]ongress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen.").
153 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 174-76 (1911). One challenged provision
of the Corporation Tax empowered the Secretary of the Treasury, with presidential ap-
proval, to promulgate rules and regulations that would make corporate tax returns sub-
ject to public and private inspection. In rejecting petitioners' claim that the provision
violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Day stated that the Amendment was "adopted
to protect against abuses in judicial procedure .... which invade the privacy of persons
in their homes, papers, and effects." Id. at 174. Three years later, in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914),Justice Day again referred to the Amendment's protec-
tion against "invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens," and quoted Boyd's con-
cern with protecting " 'the privacies of life.' " Id. at 391.
154 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921) (lack of forcible entry made
no difference to Gouled's "security and privacy of [his] home or office ....").
155 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925) ("[G]overnment employees
without a warrant shall not invade the homes of the people and violate the privacies of
life .... ).
156 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
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fuller explication of privacy as a protected interest appeared in Jus-
tice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.157
Olmstead featured nonconsensual wiretaps that yielded a mass of
transcripts used in the conspiracy trial of Olmstead, who ran a boot-
legging ring from Seattle offices. Because the phones were tapped
without entering Olmstead's property, and because he held no
property interest in the telephone wires, no search or seizure oc-
curred, even though the wiretaps violated Washington law. This
permissive approach became known as the "trespass doctrine,"
which would survive decades of eavesdropping litigation.
Brandeis's dissent was the culmination of nearly 60 years of
work begun by Judge Thomas Cooley-who coined the phrase "the
right to be let alone"t15 8-later embellished by E.L. Godkin of the
New York Evening Post,t1 9 and again in Brandeis and Samuel War-
ren's article "The Right to Privacy," published in 1890 in the
Harvard Law Review. There he suggested a right to "an inviolate
personality," to "solitude and privacy" against unwanted press
"gossip" and the unauthorized publication of private portraits taken
by "instantaneous photographs."1 60 Applying his theory to Olm-
stead's case, Brandeis looked to Boyd's protection of the "privacies
of life," and warned of government's potential to devise "[s]ubtler
and more far-reaching means of invading privacy."1 61 Telephone
tapping, he wrote, invades the privacy of the target and everyone
she calls, violating "the right most valued by civilized men"-"[t]he
right to be let alone."'' 6 2
In the 1940s163 and '50s, t6 4 the Court spoke often of the Fourth
forbids every search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the
right of privacy.").
157 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
158 THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 344 (1967).
159 E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen to His Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 58, 65-67
(1890); WESTIN, supra note 158, at 345.
160 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). Accord WESTIN, supra note 158, at 345.
161 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
163 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). In Goldman, officers eaves-
dropped on conversations through the use of a detectaphone that was attached to, but
did not penetrate, a common wall between federal agents and their suspects. Justice
Murphy, in dissent, relied heavily on Brandeis while describing "the right to privacy" as
"[o]ne of the great boons secured to the inhabitants of this country by the Bill of
Rights." Id. at 136-37 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 798
(1949); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145,
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Amendment's protection of a right of privacy. Undoubtedly Justice
Douglas was the loudest voice,1 65 but not the only one. Mainstays
like Wolfv. Colorado 166 and Rochin v. California 167 used language that
would prepare us for the abundant privacy-oriented decisions of the
'60s. 168 By 1961, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio declared, "the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States," 169 the privacy rationale announced in Katz could
claim nearly a century of support. Just when privacy overtook prop-
erty, however, may be less important than why it did so. 170
150 (1947); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 n.30
(1946); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944).
164 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 365 (1959);Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1956); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954); Salsburg
v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 554 n.1 1 (1954); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754
(1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117, 119-20 (1951); United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); District of Columbia
v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 7 (1950); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
165 E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199, 205 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas,J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
166 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society.").
167 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ("Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner...
the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . offend [and] even hardened
sensibilities.").
168 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
329 n.7 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 (1965); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 483 (1965); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 254 (1964); Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1963); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615
(1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263, 272 (1960); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255 (1960); Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
169 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
170 Katz, supra note 9, at 557-58 (social and economic changes, invention of tele-
phone, microphone, and instantaneous photography chipped away at viability of tres-
pass doctrine); Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of
Privacy, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 993, 999 (1989) ("The Supreme Court originally interpreted a
Fourth Amendment right to privacy predicated on property law concepts."); Cheryl Ket-
tier Corrada, Comment, Dow Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's Xo
Limit, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 667, 671 (1987) ("Initially, the courts defined intrusion as a
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The fact that definitions of privacy abound' 71 testifies to its elu-
sive meaning. 172 As to its status, we wonder, "[i]s privacy a situa-
tion, a right, a claim, 173 a form of control, 174 [or] a value?"' 75 As to
its characteristics, "is it related to information, to autonomy, 176 to
personal identity, 177 [or] to physical access?"' 178 Or is privacy a
greedy179 concept that promotes "hypersensitivity or an unjustified
wish to manipulate and defraud?"' 180 According to Judge Posner,
the word originally criticized one's uninvolvement in affairs of state,
then later became praise for being a "'very private person.' "181
Likewise, he claims, because "[m]ost cultures have functioned toler-
ably well without either the concept or the reality of privacy in either
its seclusion or secrecy senses," it cannot be "a precondition to val-
physical trespass on private property."). But see Tom Bush, Comment, A Privacy-Based
Analysis for Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Cases, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1791 (1987) ("IT]he
Court never equated fourth amendment rights with property law.").
171 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 425-28 (1980);
Granston, supra note 20, at 1321-22 ("Privacy is an evanescent term that has been used
by scholars and courts alike to refer to a plethora of legally cognizable claims").
172 Gavison, supra note 171, at 424.
173 Westin, supra note 158, at 7 (defining privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others").
174 CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140 (1970) (defining privacy as "the con-
trol we have over information about ourselves"); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1967) (defining privacy as control over acquaintance with
one's personal affairs.); Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 282 (1966) ("[P]rivacy exists where the persons whose actions
engender or become the objects of information retain possession of that information,
and any flow outward of that information from the persons to whom it refers (and who
share it where more than one person is involved) occurs on the initiative of its
possessors.").
175 Gavison, supra note 171, at 471. SirJames Fitzjames Stephen said simply that any-
thing "indecent" violates privacy. J.F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 160
(RJ. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873).
176 Gavison, supra note 171, at 423 (privacy promot[es] "liberty, autonomy, selfhood,
and human relations"); PRIVACY AND THE LAw, A REPORT BY THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JUSTICE 19 (1970) (Privacy is "that area of a man's life
which.., a reasonable man with an understanding of the legitimate needs of the com-
munity would think it wrong to invade.").
177 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 160, at 205-07; WESTIN, supra note 158, at 345.
178 Gavison, supra note 171, at 424; WESTIN, supra note 158, at 7 ("privacy is the vol-
untary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical
or psychological means").
179 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 261 (1977)
("[P]rivacy may still look.., like too greedy a concept to let into the storehouse of legal
rules and principles.").
180 Gavison, supra note 171, at 422 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 329 & n.22 (1966) (hyper-
sensitivity) and Posner, supra note 171, at 1 (manipulation and fraud)).
181 Posner, supra note 171, at 3.
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ued human qualities such as love and friendship, let alone . . . a
prerequisite of sanity."' 8 2 As such, Posner calls privacy "a cultural
artifact rather than an innate human need."' 8 3
It is beyond the aim of this Article to define privacy or even to
criticize the definitions of those who have. It also has been beyond
the aim of the Supreme Court. Other than having coined the
covenient shorthand "reasonable expectation of privacy,"' 1 4 the
Court has taught us little about what privacy is. We know that it is a
"zone," 85 related somehow to the "right to be let alone,"'8s6 "more
than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in
specific behavior,"' 8 7 and not "a discrete commodity possessed ab-
solutely or not at all."' 88 Privacy is an "expectation,"'' 8 9 protected
only if "actual"; 90 that is, it must be more than a "hope."' 9' The
expectation must be "reasonable"1 92 and "legitimate" 93 (which are
"interchangeable"),194 and "justifiable," 95 (which is not), 196 unless
it is "inherently" 197 so. Occasionally the justices' struggle with the
182 Id. at 6.
183 Id.
184 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
185 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
186 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
187 Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 146 (1978) (privacy is not "absolute").
189 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
190 Id.
191 California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 321 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
192 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
193 Id.
194 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 248 n.9 (1986). But see Michael
Campbell, Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 195-96 (1986) (reasonable and legitimate
are not interchangeable).
195 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984).
196 But cf. Coombs, supra note 3, at 1609 n.65 (after noting that "reasonable" comes
from Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967), "legiti-
mate" from Powell's opinion for the Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336
(1973), and "justifiable" from Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz, 389 U.S. at 353,
Coombs groups "reasonableness" with "justifiability" as "definitional stops," whereas
" 'legitimacy' implies an assessment not merely of the privacy interest but also of the
activity or object sought to be protected"); Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 686-87, 686
nn.167-68, 687 nn.169-70 (tracing "the linguistic evolution of the description of the
core interest," including the words "reasonable," "justifiable," and "legitimate"); Phyl-
lis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44
VAND. L. REV. 473, 498 (1991) ("[In Rakas,]Justice Rehnquist shifted the inquiry from a
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy to a violation of a legitimate expectation
of privacy.").
197 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 724 (1984).
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word is candid ("What are 'private' premises?"),198 but any meaning
it may have for the Court emerges only by cataloging a stack of
highly factualized' 99 holdings that assess whether a given defend-
ant's expectations were reasonable. Not surprisingly, finding out
where privacy lies requires resort to one of the Court's many "bal-
ancing" tests. 200
There have been some powerful critiques of the Court's ubiqui-
tous balancing formulae. 20 1 Tracing formulaic jurisprudence as far
back as Chief Justice Marshall, 20 2 Professor Robert Nagel asserts
that the Court's slew of tests is meant to infuse the law with objectiv-
ity, to answer skeptics, convince readers, constrain the Court itself,
and make the Court highly fact-responsive. 20 3 Yet "[d]espite their
superficial precision .... the formulae are... multiple, repetitive,
shifting, and sometimes inconsistent demands," which reflect "intel-
lectual embarrassment about the existence ofjudicial discretion but
[are] designed to assure plentiful opportunities for its exercise." 20 4
Professor Alexander Aleinikoff notes balancing's "respectable
intellectual pedigree," as well as its ability to juggle flexibility and
legitimacy while "keep[ing] everyone in the game," which any side
could win. 20 5 This "upbeat, 'can-do' judicial attitude," 20 6 he sug-
gests, ostensibly "provides a careful, sensitive, thoughtful way to
198 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 146 (1978).
199 Francis Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
ILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1950); Wayne R. LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth
AmendmentJurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 291, 310 (1986).
200 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984); Wilkens, supra note 3, at 1081
(Court's determination of when a search occurs turns on location, degree of governmen-
tal intrusiveness, and nature of activity intruded upon); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 603 (1975) (addressing the manner in which the Court determines the influ-
ence that an illegal arrest had on the admissibility of a subsequently obtained confes-
sion, the Court declared that "no single fact is dispositive"); Coombs, supra note 3, at
1600 n.24 ("[T]he usual mode of Fourth Amendment analysis involves balancing com-
peting interests.").
201 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LJ. 943, 945 (1987) ("By a 'balancing opinion,' I mean ajudicial opinion that analyzes a
constitutional question by identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches a deci-
sion or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values
to the identified interests."); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv.
165, 180 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:
An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1334-39
(1979).
202 Nagel, supra note 201, at 184-88.
203 Id. at 180-81.
204 Id. at 202.
205 Aleinikoff, supra note 201, at 960-61.
206 Id. at 963.
1993]
DANIEL B. YEAGER
dispense justice, to give each his or her due." 20 7 But, Aleinikoff cau-
tions, some values resist easy comparison and cost-benefit analy-
ses. 208 Judges often depreciate the value of one or more interests at
stake, 20 9 and claim to engage in balancing without actually doing
so. 2 10 These defects, inter alia, make balancing more program than
method, 21' where the "weighing mechanism remains a mystery, and
the result is simply read off the machine." 212 Turning to searches
and seizures, Aleinikoff cites nine Fourth Amendment themes that
involve balancing tests. 213 These tests create "the illusion that...
hard constitutional choices can be avoided.., through the inexora-
ble analytic magic of such equations." 214  Under the guise of
"[t]hree pronged tests, two-tier standards, and cost-benefit analy-
ses," 2 15 "the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of ju-
dicial will." '2 16
When piled on the uncertain contours of privacy, the Court's
discretion-laden balancing approach thus must take some blame for
the conflicting search-and-seizure decisions, even though neither
privacy nor balancing poses much difficulty in the vast number of
encounters that never make it to the Supreme Court. In this sense,
my pejorative description of the Court's use of privacy goes too far,
if it says we do not know what privacy is, simply because it becomes
difficult to identify at the edges-in the borderline cases. Rather,
the absence of criteria for the applicability of a concept about whose
usage there is general agreement does not challenge our under-
standing of or invalidate the concept, but invalidates the request for
criteria of the proposed kind.2 17 We do know what privacy is; its
207 Id. at 962.
208 Id. at 975 (noting, for example, "the exclusionary rule cases, which 'weigh' the
'likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence' against the costs of 'loss of
often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that flow from the less accurate
or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.' ").
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 982 (quoting Isay, The Method of theJurisprudence of Interests: A Critical Study, in
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 321 (Magdelena Schock ed. 1948)).
212 Id. at 993.
213 Id. at 964-65 (defining search, reasonableness of a search, reasonableness of a
seizure, meaning of probable cause, the level of suspicion required to support stops and
detentions, the scope of the exclusionary rule, the necessity of obtaining a warrant, and
the legality of pretrial detention ofjuveniles) (Citations omitted).
214 Id. at 992 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calcuus: Equal Justice or Eco-
nomic Efficieny?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 620 (1985)).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 922 n.273.
217 JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 10
(1974). Searle elegantly makes this point in his discussion of analyticity-that which
makes a statement "true in virtue of its meaning or by definition." For example, "Rec-
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meaning blurs only at the borders. But, as we see below, on the
issue of privacy, the Court is too easily puzzled, too quick to find a
case to be borderline. In this next section, I consider some Fourth
Amendment concepts that frequently occupy the Court's attention.
Were the Court to rely more heavily on the positive law-once
"workable" but "unjust," 2 18 now purportedly "clumsy" and "over-
inclusive" 219-few of the cases that these concepts have generated
would be truly puzzling.
III. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF PRIVACY AND PROPERTY
Identifying when a search or seizure occurs, and who may chal-
lenge or authorize either are the Fourth Amendment concerns that
should hinge on the positive law. With the exception of its doctrine
on seizures of property, 220 the Court has refused-at times obsti-
tangles are four-sided" is analytic, whereas "My son is now eating an apple" is not; the
latter statement is not analytic because its truth must be verified. Id. at 4-11. Answering
a critic who found where the meaning of analyticity becomes unclear, Searle writes:
The example has its effect precisely because it is a borderline case. We do not feel
completely comfortable classifying it either as analytic or non-analytic. But our rec-
ognition of it as a puzzling case, far from showing that we do not have any adequate
notion ofanalyticity, tends to show precisely the reverse. We could not recognize border-
line cases of a concept as borderline cases if we did not grasp the concept to begin with.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
218 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2, at 125 (2d ed.
1992).
219 See Coombs, supra note 3, at 1632.
220 No doubt the Fourth Amendment protects a range of interests unrelated to pri-
vacy; Katz tells us so. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 ("The Fourth Amendment... protections
... often have nothing to do with privacy at all."); Coombs, supra note 3, at 1610 n.70
("A seizure is an interference with the right of possession and use of an object and has
nothing to do with privacy as such.") (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91
n.6 (1980)). In 1984, six members of the Court agreed that "a physical trespass" was
"only marginally relevant," and "neither necessary nor sufficient" to establish a seizure.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984). The Court so concluded even
though the trespass-the transfer of a container with a hidden bug in it unbeknownst to
the recipient-might have been a " 'meaningful"' "'interference' with possessory
rights; the right to exclude." Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Cf Note, Tying
Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV.
297, 334, 337 n.188, 338 nn.189-92 (1985) (criticizing seizure-based attack on govern-
mental activity for its attempt to strike at monitoring by invalidating installation, which
may invade no Fourth Amendment interest). That reasoning lost some ground, how-
ever, in Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992), where the Court unanimously
reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding that carrying away someone's mobile home (with-
out legal process or the homeowner's assent) is not a Fourth Amendment seizure. See
Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc). For the Seventh
Circuit, the transportation of the home implicated no privacy interest of the homeowner,
thus no Fourth Amendment activity occurred. However "novel" or "interesting and
creative" Judge Posner's claim that possessory interests are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment may have been, Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 544, 547, the Court reversed the "nar-
row," "difficult[]," "puzzl[ing]," "fearful," and "exaggerated" decision below without
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nately-to "import into the law ... subtle distinctions, developed
and refined by the common law in the evolving body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has
been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical." 22'
We must reject state law when constructing federal constitutional
guarantees, the argument goes, to protect those guarantees from
the taint of local constructs that "almost by definition entail govern-
mental protection from third parties," rather than from government
itself.
2 2 2
The Court's contempt for the positive law, however, is mis-
guided. Some expressions of local law are highly relevant, even de-
terminative, of the scope of the Fourth Amendment; others are not.
Accepting, arguendo, that privacy is the core interest protected by the
prohibition on unreasonable searches, then at a minimum, the posi-
tive law should control when the interests it furthers are cotermi-
nous with those of privacy. 223 Whatever privacy means, it surely
must include the right to exclude others. 224 Thus, laws governing
trespass and abandonment reflect the goals of the Fourth Amend-
ment; so do many landlord-tenant laws, and contracts about prop-
erty. Because the positive law defines and enforces these
expectations, it provides a more fixed boundary than the Katz case-
by-case grasp for unexpressed expectations of privacy.
Until the positive law catches up with expanding property con-
dissent. Id. at 543, 547-48. It is not so much that property rights are "only marginally
relevant," the Court explained. Rather, as Hayden and Katz recognized that "protection
of privacy" is the " 'principal' object of the Amendment," property could no longer be
"the sole measure" of protection. But this is not to say, added the Court, that "this shift
in emphasis had snuffed out" the propriety of considering property law in a Fourth
Amendment context. Id. at 544-45.
221 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
222 David P. Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J.
65, 75 ("life and liberty" are rights protected from the state, not from third parties).
223 To some extent I agree with Professor White's claim that "government must
forego any benefits it acquires by the violation of [one's] property rights," although
White holds only property rights in high regard, and is content with nontrespassory
surveillance. See James B. White, Comment, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" De-
bate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1283-84 (1983); William C. Heffernan, OnJustifying Fourth
Amendment Exclusion, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1209 n.49 ("White's 'pure theory' offers no
protection for privacy interests that cannot be linked to property interests."); cf. Katz,
supra note 9, at 583-84 (personal security is protected only if informational privacy is
protected, which is intruded upon when, inter alia, government "us[es] means which con-
stitute a violation of substantive criminal or tort law").
224 Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or organi-
zation. Within that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without.
Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is
master, and the state must explain and justify any interference .... Thus, property
performs the function of maintaining independence.
Reich, supra note 109, at 771.
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cepts,225 however, Katz remains a necessary supplement to the posi-
tive law.226 But Katz currently works too hard for too little,
complicating some matters better settled without it. In this sense,
Ross Perot was right: there really "are great plans lying all over
[which] nobody ever executes." 227
225 ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 122-23 (1984) (Hegel's property fo-
cuses on control, not on exclusion of others) (citing G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY 17-20 (1956)); Bush, supra note 170, at 1792 n.162 ("Property rights are vio-
lated whenever government activity unreasonably impairs one's ability to use his posses-
sions."); Coombs, supra note 3, at 1615 n.92 ("If property seems too narrow to
encompass much of what seems worthy of protection, that perception may reflect a fail-
ure of imagination rather than anything inherent in the notion of property .... In fact,
property notions embedded in such fields as trusts, corporations, and intellectual prop-
erty are often quite expansive; some contemporary writers conceptualize property as 'an
aspect of relations between people.' "); Dutile, supra note 12 1, at 12-13 ("It would... be
a simple matter to hold that the field or scope of an electronic device trespasses to the
same extent as does a wooden pole used to remove articles from within a building by
one who does not actually go onto the property."). But see Coombs, supra at 1615 n.92
("[A] reconceptualization [of expanded property rights] might leave 'property' as vague
as 'expectations of privacy' often is now.").
226 Cf Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Pri-
vacy", 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321-29 (1981) (Court's renunciation of property inter-
ests flouts plain language of the amendment and Court's own precedents); Eulis Simien,
Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreason-
able Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487, 509 (1988) ("One of the most troubling points with
the Rakas progeny is that the Court rewrote the Fourth Amendment and in doing so
struck the Amendment's protections of papers and effects right out of the Constitu-
tion."); Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 658 n.58 ("Reliance upon property elements does
not contravene Katz"); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 268 (1984) ("[T]he Court unquestionably intended [the privacy
approach in Katz] to expand, not to replace, the Fourth Amendment's traditional cover-
age"); Bush, supra note 170, at 1794 ("[F]ourth amendment privacy rights ... foster a
sense of security and personal freedom by supplementing property law concepts when
they prove inadequate."); David W. Cunis, Note, California v. Greenwood: Discarding the
Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 543, 567-68
(1989) ("[T]he concept of privacy is often inextricably tied to property interests."); Kent
M. Williams, Note, Property Rights Protection Under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Consti-
tution: A Rationale for Providing Possessory Crimes Defendants with Automatic Standing to Chal-
lenge Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1255, 1269 n.57 (1991)
(restricting "Fourth Amendment protections to privacy interests is contrary to the his-
torical underpinnings of the amendment."); Gregory S. Fisher, Comment, Search and
Seizure, Third-Party Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 189, 206 (1991) ("[A]lthough courts speak of privacy rights and have avoided tying
the Fourth Amendment to property concepts, property and privacy are difficult to distin-
guish."). But see Mickenberg, supra note 9, at 212 (Justice Harlan's "'privacy' rule was
meant to supplant, not supplement the 'trespass' and 'property rights' views of the
Fourth Amendment.").
227 During the first presidential debate with then Governor Bill Clinton, independent
candidate Perot, in response to ABC news reporter Ann Compton's question about how
Perot would "use the powers of the presidency to get more people back into good jobs,"
made the following statement:
Step one,. . . we will... take all the plans that exist and do something with them.
Please understand there are great plans lying all over [which] nobody ever executes.
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A. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY OUTSIDE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Once freed from the hold of property law, to what did the
Court tie our "reasonable expectations?" A decade after Katz, the
Court recognized that constitutionally protected expectations must
lie somewhere outside of Supreme Court holdings. That recogni-
tion appeared in Rakas v. Illinois,228 which denied Rakas a privacy
expectation in a car in which he was a passenger, ostensibly for his
failure to claim a possessory interest in the car or the instruments of
a robbery found therein. In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist
wrote as follows:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property
is the right to exclude others .... and one who owns or lawfully pos-
sesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of
privacy . . .need not be based on a common-law interest in real or
personal property .... [b]ut . . . the Court has not altogether aban-
doned use of property concepts in determining the presence or ab-
sence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.229
Rehnquist later clarified in Rawlings v. Kentucky 230 that "in all likeli-
hood" did not mean "in all circumstances." There, the Court re-
jected Rawlings's claim that his ownership of drugs found in the
search of an acquaintance's purse violated his privacy. Rakas,Justice
Rehnquist reasoned, had made "ownership" "one fact to be consid-
ered," but "emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts
of property law ought to control ... the Fourth Amendment." 23'
The authors of separate opinions in Rakas and Rawlings thought
the majority had given property law too much23 2 or too little 233
It's like having a blueprint for a house you never built; you don't have anywhere to
sleep. Now, our challenge is to take these things, do something with them.
Presidential Debate on the Campus of Washington University, Federal News Service, Oct. II,
1992, available in LEXIS, Campaign Library, Federal News Service File.
228 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
229 Id. at 143 n.12.
230 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
231 Id. at 104-05. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), decided the same
day as Rawlings, the Court rejected defendants' claim that their having been charged
with a possessory offense conferred automatic standing on them to challenge a search
conducted under a defective warrant of Salvucci's co-defendant's mother's apartment.
"While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated," wrote the Court, "prop-
erty rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry." Id. at 91.
232 Justice White chastized the Rakas majority for tying the Fourth Amendment to
property law, when the Amendment's privacy basis traditionally has made ownership
and possession unnecessary as a condition to a search victim's right to suppress evi-
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credit, even though nothing in Rehnquist's opinions tells us how
much weight the "consider[ation]" deserves. 234 Justice Blackmun
told us in Rawlings that property rights should occupy a position
somewhere above that given them by Rehnquist, but below that of
the pre-Katz era:
Nor do I read this Court's decisions to hold that property interests
cannot be, in some circumstances, at least, weighty factors in establish-
ing the existence of Fourth Amendment rights. Not every concept of
ownership or possession is 'arcane.' Not every interest in property ex-
ists only in the desiccated atmosphere of ancient maxims and dusty
books .... In my view, th[e] "right to exclude" often may be a princi-
pal determinant in the establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amend-
ment interest.235
Despite the "weighty" and "principal" status of property law, Black-
mun concluded that Rawlings's ownership of the drugs was insuffi-
cient to ground a privacy interest, but more convincing evidence of
a bailment contract between the parties (another expectation ex-
pressed in the positive law) would have led him to conclude other-
wise.23 6 Justice Marshall dissented, agreeing with Blackmun's
dence. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (White, J., dissenting). Cf. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 60, 178 (1979) ("In the name of developing the Katz 'pri-
vacy' test, the Rakas Court has instead revived the centrality of property and possession
by explicitly investing only the owner/possessor with a clear 'legitimate expectation.' ");
Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 732 ("the exercise of associational freedom necessarily in-
volves convening with others in various places . . . where we possess no authority or
ability to erect special barriers to access, or where exclusion of others is contrary to the
purpose of the convocation.").
233 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 114-20 (Marshall,J.,
dissenting). Cf Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 13 (1983) ("[Rakas] did not elevate property rights over privacy rights
so much as it diminished the value of both.").
234 Cf Mickenberg, supra note 9, at 219 ("Katz and Alderman ... [held] that the prop-
erty right is merely one of many factors to consider in deciding Fourth Amendment
issues. Rakas carried this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion by holding that the
Jones test ... was not dispositive, and was but one of many issues to consider."); id. at
223 ("[T]he Rawlings majority... list[ed] numerous factors other than possession of the
purse which could have given the defendant a legitimate expectation of privacy.");
Coombs, supra note 3, at 1609-10 ("In the decades since Katz, the relevance of property
to Fourth Amendment law has been unclear .... Property clearly remains significant in
assessing challenges to seizures. Even when inquiry is limited to searches . . ., property
may be relevant as an indicium of legitimate expectations of privacy.").
235 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 112 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Mickenberg, supra
note 9, at 223 n.128 (suggesting that Blackmun "urges the adoption of such a fixed
rule").
236 Professor LaFave properly criticized the Court for its failure to see that a bailment
had in fact occurred, and for ignoring the legal consequences of such an arrangement. 4
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.3(c), at 308-12 (2d ed. 1987). Cf Coombs, supra note 3, at 1616-17 n.96 (because
bailment contracts rarely declare scope of interests in anticipation of police infringe-
ment on shared privacy, the law should "develop a set of presumptions based on the
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statement that not all property law is "arcane." But Marshall's en-
dorsement, too, was pitched at too high a level of abstraction to be
instructive. "Rejection of those finely drawn distinctions as irrele-
vant to the concerns of the Fourth Amendment," he wrote, "did not
render property rights wholly outside its protection." 237
B. DESERVING CLASSES OF NONTRESPASSERS
Notwithstanding its tentative and fragmented position on the
role of property law, the Court repeatedly has recognized that a real
property owner in possession, her lessee, or an overnight guest all
have protected privacy interests in the premises. In 1960, in Jones v.
United States,238 the first of two overnight-guest cases, the Court ad-
dressed whetherJones, as Evans's guest, could challenge the search
for and seizure of narcotics found in an awning outside Evans's
apartment. Jones lived elsewhere and paid no rent, but had a key to
the apartment, had a suit and shirt inside, had stayed there "maybe
a night," and was friendly with Evans, who had been gone several
days .239
Only two pages of Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court
addressed whether Jones could challenge the search and seizure.
He rejected an analysis that would turn on whether Jones was a
mere guest or invitee as opposed to a lessee or licensee, who "in a
'realistic sense, ha[s] dominion of the apartment' or who [is] 'domi-
ciled' there." 240 "Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licen-
see,' 'invitee' and 'guest,' " Frankfurter said, "often only of
gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning pro-
cedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards." 241 Be-
cause Evans had authorized Jones's presence in the apartment,
Jones was "legitimately on the premises" and, as such, an "ag-
grieved party" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 242 To Frankfurter,
expectations of most people regarding the extent to which . . . commercial bailors
should protect the bailee's interests"); id. at 1618 ("[C]ourts should recognize that a
gratuitous bailment gives rise to expectations of shared privacy even though the bailee
has only a minimal legal claim against the bailor."); Alschuler, supra note 233, at 19 (one
"who entrusts property to a relative, friend or confederate in crime ordinarily has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in any private place where the bailee stores this prop-
erty"); Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 733 n.354 ("It is arguable that people need opportu-
nities to turn their property and information over to others to fully realize the benefits of
association.").
237 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
238 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
239 Id. at 259.
240 Id. at 265.
241 Id. at 266.
242 Id. at 265, 267.
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property law thus was important and unimportant at once: distinc-
tions among various lawful entrants onto land were unimportant,
but the status of trespasser vel non was critical.
Jones's disdain for property law's "subtle distinctions ... whose
validity is largely historical" 243 is to this day a slogan of the Court.
Recently putting the slogan to work, the Court in its second over-
night-guest case, Minnesota v. Olson,244 insisted that Jones stood only
for the" 'unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally
sufficient interest in a place other than his own home.' "245 Jones,
noted the Olson Court, "was much more than just legitimately on the
premises." 246
The day after Olson had driven the getaway car in the felony-
murder of a gas-station attendant, police arrested him while illegally
entering a home occupied by two women with whom he was stay-
ing.24 7 AlthoughJones had a key and exclusive "dominion and con-
trol" over his absent friend's apartment, whereas Olson had neither,
the Court held that his status as an overnight guest made Olson a
party aggrieved by the unlawful entry.248
Justice White's privacy analysis for the 7-2 Court thus looked to
a source outside the Fourth Amendment: the customs of overnight
guests. Olson's privacy came from "a longstanding social custom"
by which "we travel to a strange city .... visit ... relatives out-of-
town," seek temporary shelter "when we are in between jobs or
homes, or when we house-sit for a friend." Because "[w]e will all be
hosts and ... guests many times in our lives," 249 houseguests need
Fourth Amendment protection. The Court dug deeper into these
relationships, referring to the vulnerability that leads guests to seek
shelter in private places. Control of the house is not the point, in-
sisted the Court; permission to be there is.250 Even without actual
control, guests usually get their way, particularly when the host is
away.25' In sum, the Court saw the host-guest relationship as mutu-
ally deferential.
How does such a sensitive, factualized approach improve a le-
243 Id. at 266.
244 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
245 Id. at 97-98 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1978)).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 93-94.
248 Id. at 98.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 99.
251 Id at 99-100. But see Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.
CI. L. REv. 47, 60 (1974) ("[I]t would violate our ordinary understanding of their tem-
porary living arrangement if the guest admitted strangers in the absence of his host.").
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gitimately-on-the-premises analysis? Why should an illegal search
of a car (Rakas) and a purse (Rawlings) generate seven separate opin-
ions toiling over whose rights police violated? In the Court's view, a
doctrine requiring no more than lawful presence at the place
searched or a valid possessory interest in the thing seized would
make successful challengers out of "mere passenger[s]" like Rakas,
bailors like Rawlings who enter into "sudden bailment[s]," "casual
visitor[s]" who "happened to be in the kitchen.., at the time of the
search" of another's basement, 252 orJustice Black's dreaded janitor
whose boss' premises were illegally searched. 253 Thus a flat ban
only on trespassers would protect undeserving classes of lawful en-
trants whose connections to the searched premises are weaker than
those of overnight guests.
The exchange is unprofitable, particularly since janitors and
casual visitors are related to the illegally searched premises, and typ-
ically will appear at suppression hearings as owners or possessors of
the thing searched or seized. Nothing is gained by attempting to
plot entrants on a continuum whose only two meaningful points-
lawfully present or not-sit conspicuously at either end. Before
Rakas, the Court had often acknowledged a search victim's property
interest in the place searched or thing seized as evidence of a consti-
tutionally protected interest. 254 Rakas permits the Court to do what
it once said it could not-untie the search from the seizure255-thus
252 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
253 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
254 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (petitioner lacked privacy expectation
in records in possession of bank); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (Brown's
challenge unsuccessful for his failure to allege possessory interest in Knuckles' ware-
house or goods seized there); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (absent
homeowner could challenge illegally seized conversations to which he was neither a
party nor present during); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (possessory inter-
est-not title--of union official in one-room office shared with others confers standing
on official); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 391 (1968) ("The only, or at least
the most natural, way in which he could have found standing to object to the admission
of the suitcase was to testify that he was its owner."); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964) (hotel night clerk cannot authorize intrusion of hotel guest's room); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (lessor could not authorize invasion of absentee
lessee's valid possessory interest in leasehold); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) (houseguest who was legitimately on premises was person aggrieved for pur-
poses of Fourth Amendment); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (defendant
abandoned property interest in rented hotel room and contents of trash can therein by
turning in key to hotel manager); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (search
could not be untied from seizure ofJeffers' goods); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("each tenant of a building" has a "constitu-
tionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the building against unlawful
breaking and entry"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (conversants have
no possessory interest in phone wires).
255 Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52. A warrantless entry into the hotel room ofJeffers' aunts by a
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discounting the importance of one's possessory interest in the thing
seized.25 6 Now, a search victim needs a socially significant relation-
ship with the place searched before she can complain about the
thing seized. As a result, rejecting the "no trespassing" principle in
Jones has produced a new standard, under which courts must mea-
sure the extent to which a lawful entrant whose head never touches
a pillow participates in "longstanding social custom[s]," is "vulner-
abl[e]," and is subject to reciprocity and deference. 25 7 What once
was an assessment of "who is a trespasser," has become one of
"who among nontrespassers deserves Fourth Amendment protec-
tion?" Thus the critique of property-based analysis has shifted from
charges of too stingy to too permissive, and for no good reason.
Contrary to the Court's and others' conclusions, it would be much
easier, perhaps more just, and would make us no poorer in our zeal
to bring criminals to book were we to grant relief to litigants like
Rakas and Rawlings. 258
C. UNLAWFUL VANTAGE POINTS
Even a trespass by law enforcement is irrelevant to whether the
government has engaged in a Fourth Amendment search259 so long
narcotics agent revealed cocaine and codeine, kept in violation of federal criminal laws.
The drugs were found inside a box in the room's closet. Entry was made with the help
of hotel employees. The aunts paid for the room, but Jeffers had a key and permission
to enter at will. "[T]heir intrusion was conducted surreptitiously and by means de-
nounced as criminal," wrote the Court. Id. Without saying that there was no violation
ofJeffers' privacy, the Court excluded the evidence because, at the least, the seizure was
illegal. Id.
256 Compare Alschuler, supra note 233, at 14-17 (Rawlings Court misunderstood differ-
ence between search and seizure, the latter of which is clearly property based) and Wil-
liam A. Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge
Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 52 (1975) ("[I]f I hid my gun in a neighbor's house
without his consent and the police searched his house illegally, I should be able to chal-
lenge the seizure of the gun but not the search of the house, because I had no right of
privacy in the house.") with Weinreb, supra note 251, at 66 ("In a situation in which
neither privacy of presence nor privacy of place is involved, a person's relationship to a
seized item, however incriminating, does not establish any interest in privacy that the
Fourth Amendment protects.").
257 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990).
258 But cf Coombs, supra note 3, at 1624 ("The test the f[ones] Court adopted, how-
ever, was broader than necessary to respond to genuine relational concerns and thus
vulnerable to the scathing criticism it received in Rakas v. Illinois .... People may fre-
quently be in a place legitimately without having the sort of intimate relationship with its
owner that would justify a derivative Fourth Amendment claim."); id. at 1632 (calling
Jones "overinclusive" and "clumsy"); Letter from Wayne R. LaFave to the author (Mar.
26, 1993) (on file with author) ("[E]xtreme versions of standing, it seems to me, provide
unnecessary ammunition for those who seek abolition of the exclusionary rule.").
259 The Court began rejecting expressions of state positive law in much the same way
that Congress began authorizing searches and seizures-statute by statute, bit by bit.
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as it stays within the interest-holder's "open field. ' ' 260 This was Jus-
tice Holmes' conclusion in Hester v. United States,26 t where revenue
agents apparently trespassed onto a suspect's property and seized
illegally possessed liquor that the suspects had dropped when flee-
ing from the officers. 262 Because the officers, who "supposed they
During Prohibition, the Court refused to exclude evidence based on the tort of trespass
ab initio, which invalidates lawful entries followed by unlawful assertions of official au-
thority. The first of these cases addressed the admissibility of liquor lawfully obtained
by revenue agents in a valid search for evidence of violations of the National Prohibition
Act. See McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927). Because the agents unlawfully
destroyed the great majority of the liquor seized, argued McGuire, the illegality infected
the admissibility of the remaining and lawfully obtained liquor, thus making the officers'
otherwise lawful entry unlawful ab initio. The Court acknowledged the relevance of the
tort to the officers' personal liability for abuse of authority, but not to the question of
admissibility. Id. at 99-100.
Twenty-five years later, in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a govern-
ment informant consensually entered an old acquaintance's business-and residence, and
secretly transmitted their discussion of the opium trade to a federal agent outside. The
Court, through Justice Jackson, dismissed both the tort, "whose origin, history, and pur-
pose do not justify its application where the right of the government to make use of
evidence is involved," and the law of fraud, partly because of the absence of an affirma-
tive misrepresentation, and also because of the irrelevance of such "fine-spun doctrines"
to the admissibility of evidence. Id. at 752. As for the claim that the eavesdropping
agent had trespassed by entering in the informant's pocket that held the radio transistor,
see id. at 765-66 (Burton,J., dissenting), Jackson said it "verges on the frivolous." Id. at
752.
Nearly everyone who has ever commented on trespass ab initio has attacked it, in-
cluding Justice Holmes, who made it the object of his famous quip about the "revolting"
aspect of precedent that binds courts for "no better reason ... than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897). For discussions of trespass ab initio, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 25, at 150-52 (5th ed. 1984); Francis H. Bohlen
& Harry Shulman, Effect of Subsequent M1isconduct Upon a Lawful Arrest, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
841 (1928); Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE LJ. 147 (1918); Glanville L. Wil-
liams, A Strange Offspring of Trespass Ab Initio, 52 LAw Q. REV. 106 (1936).
260 An "open field" is "any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage,"
or one which is too far, too exposed, and not intimate enough to be protected like the
house. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987); United States v. Oliver, 466
U.S. 170, 180 n.ll (1984).
261 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
262 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Hester means only that an officer
may "enter private land from which the public is not excluded and make observations
from that vantage point," although the trial record indicated that "one of the agents
crossed a pasture fence" en route to the house); Dutile, supra note 121, at 5 ("Perhaps
the Hester Court was swayed by the fact that the defendant himself did not own the land
but lived there with his father, the legal title holder.... In any event, the Court indicated
that it was not convinced that a trespass actually occurred.").
The Hester Court did not have occasion to decide whether a trespass upon fenced
land would have been deemed a violation of the fourth amendment. One cannot
know whether the agents initially made their observations from outside or inside the
Hester property line. If they were outside, they may have had probable cause to
believe that a crime was committed in their presence. The Court does not say
whether other people crossed the Hester property as a routine matter, although it is
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were on Hester's [father's] land," walked not into the house or its
adjacent "curtilage," but only so far as the "open field," Holmes
concluded that the officers had not searched Hester.263
Although Holmes rested his conclusion on a spurious interpre-
tation of Blackstone, 26 4 Hester is still good law, 2 65 and is often trot-
ted out as support for officers' rights to violate certain property
rights with impunity.26 6 Yet, as terms of art, not only are "open
field" and "curtilage" difficult to describe, 267 but they themselves
are property concepts. 268 We know that an open field "need be
neither 'open' nor a 'field,'"269 but is "unoccupied and undevel-
oped land," which must be fenced-off or secluded, close enough to
plain that the officers saw a number of people coming and going from Hester's
father's house.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated
by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
263 Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59. So too is the Constitution's lack of contextual recogni-
tion of "open fields" thought by many to be meaningless. While the framers did reject
James Madison's proposal that "other property" appear where the word "effects" now
appears, this was meant not to divide property owners' land into protected and unpro-
tected parcels, but to ensure that personal and not just real property would receive con-
stitutional protection. See Currie, supra note 222, at 100-01 (the text has not obstructed
the Court from holding that "a court order constituted a 'search,' a regulation of land
use a 'taking,' and a photograph a 'writing' within the copyright clause").
264 Blackstone distinguished curtilage from open fields to justify treating the former
as burglary and the latter as trespass; both were criminal in any event. See Saltzburg,
supra note 262, at 16.
265 Even though the open-fields language may have been invoked only to justify the
seizure of abandoned property, not to establish a rule that all trespasses onto open fields
are of no concern to the Fourth Amendment, id. at 17, the case of United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927), makes the meaning of Hester even less clear. There, after Coast
Guard officers lawfully seized a vessel suspected of violating the revenue laws, the boat-
swain's preboarding examination with a searchlight did not constitute a search, despite
the descriptive name of the tool used. Justice Brandeis's short opinion for the Court
mysteriously cited Hester, perhaps because trespass is permissible if it follows lawful ob-
servation of a crime. Id. at 563.
266 See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865
(1974) (when state health inspector made warrantless entry onto corporation's outdoor
premises to test smoke being emitted from the chimneys, he stood somewhere between
two stack heights and a quarter mile away from the stack, and was "well within the 'open
fields' exception to the Fourth Amendment approved in Hester").
267 For a history of "open fields," see Neil C. McCabe, State Constitutions and the "Open
Fields" Doctrine: A Historical-Definitional Analysis of the Scope of Protection Against Warrantless
Searches of "Possessions", 13 VT. L. REV. 179 (1988).
268 See Bush, supra note 170, at 1786 ("The Court's willingness to wed the Fourth
Amendment to the distinction between curtilage and open fields belies its own admoni-
tion that property concepts are not controlling."); Rosemarie Falcone, Note, "California
v. Ciraolo"- The Demise of Private Property, 47 LA. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (1987) ("Just as in
Oliver, the [Ciraolo] Court applied a per se rule based upon property concepts which ig-
nored parts of the Katz analysis, while implying that a different rule would be applicable
to a private residence and its curtilage.").
269 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.l 1 (1984).
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the house, and the situs of intimate activity before it becomes pri-
vate, protected curtilage.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Oliver v. United States,270
thought the open field/curtilage distinction would be administered
easily. In Oliver, two Kentucky state police officers drove past a
house and a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign on it, then
walked several hundred yards down a footpath past a barn and a
camper, ignoring Oliver, who shouted "no hunting" at them. The
Court held that the officers did not search Oliver's land, on which
they discovered marijuana plants. 271
Clarity, Powell stated, will not suffer if constitutional protec-
tions turn on the differences between curtilage and open fields. 272
Simply put, "the area around the home to which the activity of home
life extends is a familiar one easily understood from our daily expe-
rience." 273 This well-known area, wrote Powell, was more pertinent
than the law of trespass, which is "but one element in determining
whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. ' 274 Since the influ-
ence of property law on the Fourth Amendment "has been discred-
ited," and since "a property interest in premises may not be
sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy," Powell
subordinated the law of trespass to the curtilage/open-field
distinction: 275
[T]he common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy and that would not be served by applying
the strictures of trespass to public officers. Criminal laws against tres-
pass are prophylactic: they protect against ihitruders who poach, steal
livestock, and crops, or vandalize property. And the civil action of
trespass . . . authoriz[es] an owner to defeat claims of prescription by
asserting his own title.2 76
Trespass laws, he added, "have little or no relevance" 277 to the
Fourth Amendment if officers stay within the field. The open field
includes "thickly wooded area[s]" 278 and later, barns, 279 which our
270 466 U.S. at 170.
271 Id. at 176-77.
272 Id. at 182 n.12.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 183-84.
275 Id. at 183; see also Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544 n.7 (1992) ("In
holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful
that the Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all kinds of property.")
(citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77).
276 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 n.15.
277 Id. at 183-84.
278 Id. at 180 n.ll.
279 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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daily experience tells us are suited neither to "lovers' trysts," "wor-
ship services," 280 nor any other of the "privacies of life" 28' associ-
ated with the home. .Although his standard was naively dependent
on experiences which are far from daily, Powell was confident that
the open field/curtilage distinction would not need case-by-case
study.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented from the
Court's "startling conclusion" that no search had occurred.282 Mar-
shall acknowledged that "privacy interests are not coterminous with
property rights," but since "property rights reflect society's explicit
recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain ar-
eas, [they] should be considered." 28 3 These were Justice Powell's
own words from a past foray into the property thicket. 28 4 Joining
them with Rehnquist's claim that one's right to exclude "in all likeli-
hood" includes a protected privacy interest, 28 5 Marshall weighted
Kentucky's law of trespass more heavily than did the Justices whose
words he borrowed. Not only does the positive law recognize Oli-
ver's interest, Marshall wrote, but it also criminalizes the failure to
respect that interest.286 Finally, he stated, police already are
charged with enforcing the laws that protect possessors of private
land from intruders; as a result, trespass is a concept better known
to citizens and police than are privacy, open fields, and curtilage. 287
After three years to consider the meaning of "open field," the
Court decided United States v. Dunn,2 8 which was identical to Oliver
in important respects. In Dunn, DEA agents traveled a half-mile off
a public road over Dunn's fenced-in land, crossed over three more
wooden and barbed-wire fences, stepped under the eaves of his
280 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 n.10; id. at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
282 Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf Saltzburg, supra note 262, at 17 ("[Ujntil
Oliver, no one would have suspected that the Court would turn its back on the physical
invasions that gave birth to the Fourth Amendment and that were the focus of the
Court's attention for so many years prior to Katz.").
283 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 189-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Dutitle, supra note 121, at 9
("Presumably the civil trespass doctrine itself relates at least partially to the kind of se-
curity guaranteed by the Constitution."); Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 719-20.
284 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
285 Id. at 143 n.12.
286 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 189-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287 Id. at 195-96; cf McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,458-59 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring) ("In prying up the porch window and climbing into the landlady's bed-
room, [the officers] were guilty of breaking and entering-a felony in law and a crime far
more serious than the one they were engaged in suppressing.").
288 480 U.S. 294 (1987). For a thorough discussion of Dunn, see Clifford S. Fishman,




barn, and peered with a flashlight through opaque fishnetting.2 89
Disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that no search had oc-
curred, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, again dis-
sented, 290 but Stevens was conspicuously absent, given the similarity
of the two cases.
Stevens is not the only waffler when it comes to the influence of
the positive law on expectations of privacy. Justices Powell and
Blackmun have endorsed the positive law as "weighty" and "princi-
pal" considerations that "in all likelihood" stand for privacy. An
attentive reading of their opinions, however, shows only that both
are staunchly opposed to overflight and otherwise uninterested in
heavily weighting the positive law in Fourth Amendment cases.
For example, in the context of administrative aerial photogra-
phy of commercial premises, both the majority and the dissent ar-
gued that different aspects of Michigan's positive law played a part
in determining the constitutionality of EPA action.291 For the ma-
jority, aerial observation without actual physical entry is constitu-
tional unless extraordinarily aided by technology. Moreover,
Michigan's trade secret law was irrelevant against the government,
who utilized aerial photography in order to regulate, not compete
with, petitioner Dow Chemical Company. 292 For Justice Powell,
who dissented, the majority's reliance on the old trespass doctrine
was misplaced, but the trade-secret law (also a property concept),
even if not violated, was a tell-tale sign of a legitimate privacy inter-
est.2 93 Dow, Powell reasoned, had elaborate security measures-in-
cluding private investigation of all low-flying planes-meant to keep
secret its chemical manufacturing process.294 Accordingly, Powell,
whom Blackmun joined, found that Dow's attempt to guard secrets
protected by law gave the company a privacy interest in the Fourth
Amendment sense. 295
289 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 312 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (" 'Private land marked in a fashion suffi-
cient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the State in which the
land lies is protected by the Fourth [Amendment]'. By rejecting this rule, 'the Court is
willing to sanction the introduction of evidence seized pursuant to a potentially criminal
activity (trespassing) in order to convict an individual of a slightly more serious
crime.' "). (citation omitted).
291 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
292 Id. at 231-32.
293 Id. at 248-49 (Powell, J., dissenting in part); cf. Corrada, supra note 170, at 690
(noting that Powell's critique of majority for using trespass doctrine as proxy for privacy
conflicts with his "attempt to resurrect property concepts in recognizing privacy inter-
ests in trade secrets").
294 Dow, 476 U.S. at 241-42 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
295 [T]hose laws constitute society's express determination that commercial entities
have a legitimate interest in the privacy of certain kinds of property. Dow has taken
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Powell's dissent is superficially an appealing blend of Katz and
the positive law. Trade secret laws and the Fourth Amendment may
diverge in objective and application, 296 but both have a secrecy com-
ponent 297 and are similar enough that precautions taken in one
arena arguably should be respected in the other. However, the EPA
sought to regulate, not steal, Dow's secret processes. Thus the al-
ready imperfect fit between the trade secret tort and the Fourth
Amendment is made worse, and reliance on it misplaced. In other
words, Powell was correct to invoke Katz, but not a law framed in
terms of theft of information, which simply did not occur in Dow
Chemical. For that reason alone, the trade secret tort was useless in
that context.
In California v. Ciraolo,298 decided the same day, Powell reiter-
ated the need to trace our expectations to a source outside the
Court's holdings. Again joined in dissent by Blackmun, he pro-
tested that the majority's approval of naked-eye observations from
an airplane over Ciraolo's marijuana plot relied solely on the fact
that the Federal Aviation Administration has made the skies into a
public highway.299 One outside source to which Powell would not
look to was the safety, not privacy-based FAA regulations governing
the overflight of private property. After Powell retired, the Court in
a similar case, Florida v. Riley,300 upheld helicopter overflight.
every feasible step to protect information claimed to constitute trade secrets from
the public and particularly from its competitors. Accordingly, Dow has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in its commercial facility.
Id. at 249 (Powell, J., dissenting in part); id. at 249 n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting in part)
("Contrary to the Court's assertion, Dow does not claim that Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of its facility is coextensive with the scope of trade secret statutes .... Rather,
Dow argues that the existence of those statutes provides support for its claim that soci-
ety recognizes commercial privacy interests as reasonable.").
Inherent in the law of trespass and, in the very concept of private property as Locke
asserts, is the societal recognition that Dow's protection of its property lines is a
manifestation of its intent and right to exclude others. By asserting its rights as a
property owner, Dow... gave notice of its intent to reserve its complex for private
use, and society, through its trespass laws and general recognition of property
rights, implicitly acquiesced in the reasonableness of this expectation.
Bush, supra note 170, at 1796.
296 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment
Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 466-72 (1992).
297 Id. at 466.
298 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
299 Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting). For the majority, observation from an airplane
(or a double-decker bus), id. at 211, is no more unreasonable a search than one from
ground level, so long as the officer occupies "a public vantage point where he has a right
to be" as defined by the FAA and "which renders the activities clearly visible." Id. at
213. Cf LaFave, supra note 199, at 298 ("The ChiefJustice's reference to double-decker
buses suggests that his travels to London had a profound effect upon his outlook .... ")
(citing Laurence Bodine, Flood of ABAers in London, 71 A.B.A.J., Sept. 1985, at 124-27).
300 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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There, Justice Blackmun stayed put, requiring more than an abided-
by safety regulation to validate the aerial observation; 30' but Stevens
again changed sides, abandoning his permissive view of overflight in
Ciraolo for a restrictive view of the same.30 2
This equivocating is understandable; the overflight cases are
puzzling. If we want to discount the FAA regulations for their safety
orientation, and give only privacy-based laws outcome-determina-
tive status, then the overflight cases were wrong. The regulations
do, however, speak marginally to privacy: one may harbor in one's
curtilage 1000 feet of privacy from naked-eye airplane observa-
tion. 303 Is "marginally" enough to answer whether a search oc-
curred? Requiring that the positive law in question be primarily
privacy-based would not only collapse the positive law into Katz,
but, even worse, would double-count Katz. One would first need to
define privacy to determine which positive laws control. Then, if the
movant-say, Katz or Riley-insists that the Constitution protects
where the positive law does not, privacy must be defined again.
If all positive laws, even those unrelated to privacy, were con-
clusive of the parties' expectations, then compliance or noncompli-
ance with FAA regulations would decide the case and avoid the task
of defining privacy or the extent to which a given positive law is
privacy-based. But such a regime would sweep far too broadly, and
would invalidate, for example, otherwise lawful overflight simply be-
cause the pilot's license had expired or because wing lights of a cer-
tain color were not lit on the aircraft. 0 4 Exclusion there would be
inappropriate not so much because the license and colored-light vi-
olations concern neither privacy nor property, but because they, un-
like the minimum height regulations, are not what enabled law
enforcement to obtain the information sought.
As a shorthand rule, I therefore suggest the following: When
the search victim can point to no law-based expectation that pro-
tects her from the kind of surveillance in question, Katz comes into
play to place a ratchet-like restraint on quests for evidence.30 5 I say
"ratchet-like," because the government cannot in my view use the
301 Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
302 Id. at 456-67 (joining Brennan, J., dissenting).
303 Similarly, when police observe activity on property that abuts an interstate high-
way only by slowing down to under the prescribed minimum of 40 miles per hour,
police have invaded the privacy one retains by having a minimum speed limit that
shields activity from view that could be discerned only at a slower speed.
Letter from Wayne R. LaFave to the author (Mar. 26, 1993) (on file with author).
304 Professor LaFave suggested this hypothetical to me by letter. See id.
305 Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) ("We emphasize that
Congress' power under § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is limited to adopting meas-
ures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
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positive law to foreclose Katz, but a search victim can. As in the
overflight cases, once established that one lawfully could do what the
government did, Katz reaches into its separate inventory of expecta-
tions to answer whether that fact, without more, makes it unreasona-
ble to expect that no one would. Yet there is no good reason for
racing to Katz. Underprotective positive laws sent Charles Katz to
the Supreme Court in the first place and were corrected by Con-
gress promptly afterward.30 6 So few after Katz have prevailed that
the positive law is a better place to start, both legislatively and judi-
cially, than is reliance on Katz's case, which today makes him seem
no more than a chance beneficiary.
D. ABANDONMENT OF CHATTELS
Some state laws tailored to core Fourth Amendment concerns
receive no support from any member of the Court. For example,
possessors of property who display a present intent to forever relin-
quish their interest are said under the laws of all 50 states to have
abandoned the property.30 7 Absent another positive law limiting
this construct, it is senseless to deny the law of abandonment a place
in the Fourth Amendment.
The issue of abandoned property first arose in Hester, but we
should not take too seriously the Court's conclusion that Hester's
attempted escape from gun-toting, trespassing revenue agents
meant he abandoned containers of liquor on his father's property.
Decades later, the Court held that a spy abandoned a hollow pencil
containing microfilm and a block of wood containing a cipher pad in
the wastebasket of a hotel room, the key to which he had turned in
prior to the search.308 There, too, the Court skipped over whether
FBI agents coerced or caused the defendant to leave the articles be-
hind, so we have no meaningful discussion of abandonment in the
Court's opinions on point.3 0 9
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 341-50 (2d ed. 1988).
306 See Title III, Omnibus Crime Contol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2511, 2515-2518, 2520-21.
307 Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R. Co., 127 N.E. 237, 238 (N.Y. 1920) ("The aban-
donment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession, or claim to or of it-a
virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not presumed."); See CURTIS J. BERGER,
LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 647-49 (3d ed. 1983) (once one relinquishes property, first
possessor thereafter is new owner).
308 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960).
309 "So far as the record shows," wrote Justice Frankfurter, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel
"had abandoned these articles. He had thrown them away .... There can be nothing
unlawful in the Government's appropriation of such abandoned property." Id. at 241;
cf. California v. Hodari D., I11 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (no seizure occurs until fleeing sus-
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Already lacking any real support from the Court, the law of
abandonment in Fourth Amendment decisionmaking had little
chance of surviving Katz,310 which would needlessly mediate the
Court's task: "The primary object of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect privacy, not property, and the question in this case.. . is not
whether [defendant] had abandoned his interest in the property-law
sense, but whether he retained a subjective expectation of privacy
... that society accepts as objectively reasonable." 31 1 Justice White
used these words to describe a gambler's challenge to a search of an
apartment building's publicly accessible communal trash bin.312
Although the Court failed to reach the merits there, it tried to settle
the issue soon after in California v. Greenwood 313 by rejecting Green-
wood's claim that he had a privacy interest in his trash in bags set by
the curb for pick-up. Although most of the courts of appeals that
had reached the issue resolved it on abandonment grounds, the
Court refused to formulate a rule that would make the Amendment
depend on the law of the particular state where the search
occurred.3 14
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justice Marshall,
agreed with only that part of the majority's opinion, 315 though both
earlier had stated otherwise when the law of trespass was at issue.316
Brennan claimed that "the voluntary relinquishment of possession
or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to a relin-
quishment of a privacy expectation in it."317 For support, he re-
pect submits to show of authority, so articles discarded prior to submission are aban-
doned and not fruits of seizure).
310 But see, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
541 (1990) (suspect did not abandon articles thrown onto hood of car when police ap-
prehended him); cf Coombs, supra note 3, at 1606 ("[I]t is black letter law that Fourth
Amendment claims can be lost by abandoning the property searched, even
inadvertently.").
311 California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from dismis-
sal of certiorari as improvidently granted).
312 Id.
313 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
314 Id. at 43.
315 Id. at 51 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("The Court properly rejects the State's attempt
to distinguish trash searches from other searches on the theory that trash is abandoned
and therefore not entitled to an expectation of privacy."). But cf. Herdrich, supra note
170, at 1017 (stating that the Court did utilize abandonment doctrine, "which defies the
Katz rationale .... [and] significantly narrows the concept of Fourth Amendment privacy
rights").
316 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 312 n.3 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 195-96 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Edward G. Mascolo, The Role
of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20
BUFF. L. REV. 399, 401 (1971) (abandonment in a property sense is an "initial point of
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ferred to a Cheektowaga, New York ordinance prohibiting anyone
but city trash workers from snooping in another's garbage,318 and to
an Orange County, California (where Greenwood lived) ordinance
prohibiting the burning or burying of refuse. 319
Of course the Cheektowaga ordinance is irrelevant; but if Or-
ange County had such a law, it should trump the law of abandon-
ment. Otherwise, the locality's attempt to redescribe the property
would be made meaningless. On the other hand, the prohibition on
burning or burying garbage says much about choice, but little about
county residents' expectations once they exercise that choice, how-
ever hollow it may be.
Brennan further stated that any other view of garbage would
erase our privacy in mail, once entrusted to a carrier.320 He then
discounted the relevance of congressional protection of the
mails,3 21 apparently because the Court also protects mail from war-
rantless searches.
That in my view gets us nowhere. Because no sender of mail is
indifferent to whether it reaches the addressee, Congress and the
Court protect mail. Likewise, because "what we are dealing with
here is trash," 322 not mail, the absence of a positive law on point
reflects our feelings about trash. In light of legislative inaction, a
contract could provide privately what Orange County did not. If the
refuse company breaches at the behest of the government, then the
government should lose the ill-gotten profit. But because there was
no such agreement in Greenwood, we should be able to live with the
outcome that the law of abandonment suggests. Rather than criti-
cize the Court's "veiled abandonment analysis" 323 for such things as
its insensitivity to our "behavioral manifestations," 324 I would look
to the reform of the positive law, not tortured readings of Katz, for
relief from overreaching law enforcers.
inquiry," a "point of reference" that "is not controlling on the issue of abandonment in
the law of search and seizure").
318 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
319 Id. at 54-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
320 Id. at 55 (Brennan J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
321 Id. at 55 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
322 United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992) (no Fourth Amendment
protection in shredded documents in garbage). With mail, of course, the addressee could
view and treat the mail as garbage and thereby remove its private characteristics.
323 Jon E. Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the
Trash Pile-Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 581, 589 (1991).
324 Id. at 604.
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E. PRIVATELY AUTHORIZED SEARCHES
The final area of the Fourth Amendment where the Court un-
derstates the relevance of the positive law is privately authorized or
"consent" searches. These searches are reasonable if they are vol-
untary. 325 Authorization may come from anyone whom, given the
facts available at the moment, police reasonably believe has com-
mon authority over the place or thing.3 26 Here, too, the Court's
contextual approach to interests resolves conflicts less effectively
than the positive law.
Not until the 1960s did the Court answer whether an inferior
interest-holder (e.g., a bailee) could consent to a search absent the
consent of the superior interest-holder (e.g., a bailor).3 27 Since
then, the Court's self-imposed task of assessing authority and risk
has been as elusive as its quest for sources of privacy expectations
outside its own holdings.3 28 As Chapman v. United States,329 decided a
year after Jones, illustrates, the positive law could improve things
somewhat.
Chapman was a tenant whose illegal distillery was discovered by
Georgia police after his landlord admitted an officer through the
bathroom window of a house Chapman leased. After citingJones for
the proposition that property law is irrelevant to the Fourth Amend-
ment, the majority, through Justice Whittaker, invalidated the land-
lord's consent. Along the way, the Court struggled unsuccessfully
to avoid the local property laws that pervaded the separate opinions
of Justices Frankfurter and Clark.
Chapman's lease gave the landlord no right to enter or consent
to the entry of others. The government, however, argued that a
property owner may delegate to officers her common law right to
"view waste."330 Illegal distilleries are wasteful, and the landlord
might have "ha[d] solid ground for believing his lessee [was] using
the house as an illegal distillery."' 33 ' Moreover, one Georgia statute
empowered landlords to forfeit leaseholds used as illegal distilleries,
325 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
326 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
327 The question began as "whether it is possible for a wife, in the absence of her
husband . . . to waive his constitutional rights," Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313,
317 (1921).
328 Cf Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer, The Assumption of Risk Doctrine and
Third-Party Consent Searches, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 195, 208 (1990) (unlike in contractual
relationships, "[b]ecause the boundaries of social relationships are more diffuse and
fluid, anticipation of risks 'inherent' in the relationship will be much more difficult").
329 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
330 Id. at 616.
331 Id. at 619 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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and another labeled structures used for the same as nuisances.33 2
Whittaker countered all three arguments, not on the ground that
property law was irrelevant, but because the landlord did not know
how the house was being used (despite the overwhelming odor of
whiskey mash emanating from within), and because of his resorting
to improper procedure in order to abate a nuisance.
In dissent, Justice Clark put the matter directly: "The 'reasona-
bleness' of the search hinges on the rights of the landlord under
Georgia law .... ."333 In his view, the entry fell under the landlord's
statutory right to terminate the lease, which Chapman had used for
illegal purposes. As a result, "[the landlord] was merely repossess-
ing his property, not abating a nuisance. ' '3s4
Since all three opinions addressed the contract for lease and
landlord-tenant law, the majority's claim that local law is not the
stuff of which the Fourth Amendment is made packs little punch.
But Chapman remains a rather exotic case. As the Court began to
hear more consent cases, the references to state law became fewer.
The law of consent would soon have its own relativism.
Three years after Chapman, the Court in Stoner v. California335
invalidated a Pomona, California night clerk's consent to a police
search of an armed robber's hotel room. After noting the absence
of a state law giving hotel managers such authority, Justice Stewart's
majority opinion called the right to refuse entry one which "only
[Stoner] could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an
agent."3 36 "[T]he rights protected by the Fourth Amendment,"
Stewart continued, "are not to be eroded by strained applications of
the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent author-
ity.' ,,337 Again, the Court looked to Jones as support for this asser-
tion, but the reference was too loose to have even a trace of value.
Whether we should apply agency law and apparent authority when
they are neither strained nor unrealistic, Stoner left a mystery.
After emphasizing in a subsequent case 338 the importance of
ownership to the validity of third-party consent, the Court declared
in 1969 that the duffel bag of one Frazier-ajoint user who kept the
332 Id. at 617.
333 Id. at 620 (Clark, J., dissenting).
334 Id. at 621 (Clark, J., dissenting).
335 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
336 Id. at 488-89.
337 Id. at 488. But cf Dutile, supra note 121, at 16 ("In third-party consent cases... it
is precisely the agency and property points which the Court should bear in mind.").
338 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n. 11 (1968) (noting that, had con-
sent not been coerced, consenting party's ownership of both the house and chattel
searched and seized would have been good as against her grandson who lived with her).
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bag at co-joint user Rawls's mother's house-could be searched on
Rawls's authority.a39 Even if the division of the bag into compart-
ments eliminated Rawls's actual authority under Stoner, the distinc-
tion between actual and apparent was a "metaphysical subtlet[y]"
lacking legal consequences. 340 Finally, in 1974, the Court defined
the common authority that could empower one to consent to inva-
sion of another's interest. There, in United States v. Matlock,3 41 of-
ficers arrested Matlock in the front yard of the house he shared with
Gayle Graff. They obtained Graff's consent to search the house
without first asking Matlock. In the closet of the couple's bedroom
police found the fruits of a bank robbery.3 42
Matlock pronounced that consent was a matter of authority,
which property law apparently is too crude to capture:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere
property interest a third party has in the property. The authority
which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of
property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements . . . but
rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the in-
spection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched. 343
The resemblance of this language to Rakas is striking. Neither deci-
sion wishes to be tied to the positive law nor, it seems, to the other.
The upshot is separate inquiries for privacy and authority, which in
turn, allows for the ridiculous case in which someone could validly
consent to an invasion but lack standing to challenge it.
I admit that property interests may be "mere" and "refined," 344
but can mutual use and joint access and control be described mean-
ingfully in anything but property terms? Certainly "for most pur-
poses" is itself a term of refinement. When is it reasonable to
expect a co-inhabitant to permit inspection? Would a superior in-
terest-holder ever expect her subordinate interest-holder to permit
such an invasion? 345 And what are we to make of the words "as-
339 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
340 Id. at 740.
341 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
342 Id. at 166-67.
343 Id. at 171 n.7.
344 Id.
345 Cf Coombs, supra note 3, at 1599-1600 ("[W]here the intimacy of the relationship
between the consenter and the defendant renders betrayal of the defendant's interests
unlikely, courts should take care to assure themselves that the consent was uncoerced.").
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sumed the risk"?3 4 6 Can co-inhabitants contract away the risk, or
does it follow automatically from authority?3 47
Although police should have sought Matlock's consent, Graff's
was good simply because she was a co-tenant holding an undivided
interest in the leased property, giving her an interest equal to Mat-
lock's. Frazier (the duffel-bag case) concededly poses some difficulty
because the parties' legal arrangement (either as bailment or co-ten-
ancy)3 48 indeed was sketchy enough to call "metaphysical." In that
case-clearly a boundary concern-we might resort to Professor
Mary Coombs's thicker, storied and more complex approach to dis-
cover the contours of the parties' understanding. 349 But in the
lion's share of cases the parties' legal arrangement is much more
easily assessed. In those disputes, our assessment of the extent of a
consenting party's authority, which the Court has made a question
346 Cf id. at 1597-98 ("In the dynamics of the real world .... we all run the risk that
those we thought irrevocably committed to us may choose to act against us. On the
other hand, the government should not be permitted to intensify this risk in human
society."); id. at 1650 ("Neither as a matter of description nor prescription does it make
sense to treat betrayal by our friends as the norm.").
347 Fisher, supra note 226, at 193 n.36 ("Courts have never fully articulated why de-
fendants' assumption of risk should follow from third parties' joint control."); See Doro-
thy K. Kagehiro et al., Reasonable Expectation of Pivacy and Third-Party Consent Searches, 15
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 121, 125 (1991) (Matlock Court believed its assumption of-risk con-
clusion "requir[ed] no explanation").
348 A bailment is the "rightful possession of goods by one who is not the true owner,"
"based on a contract, express or implied." RALPH E. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 689 (3d ed. 1981); See 4 BERNARD E. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§ 129 (9th ed. 1991) ("A bailment.., is the deposit of personal property with another,
usually for a particular purpose, under an express or implied contract."); LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 218, § 3.10, at 243 (referring to Rawls as a "bailee" of Frazier's bag).
349 In her influential article on shared privacy, Professor Coombs advocates what she
calls a value-neutral (meaning the state will benefit from her consent theory, and the
individual from her standing theory) set of intricate presumptions concerning which re-
lationships are private and which are not. Coombs, supra note 3, at 1650-51. "[O]utside
the presumptive categories," she writes, litigants who "chose to open their relationship
to examination" would present a "'thick description' of the relevant aspects of their
lives together, from which a more sensitive judgment of the relational claim could be
made." Id. at 1654. The thick, storied approach, Coombs says, emphasizes that
"[d]ecisions must grow out of an analysis of the relationships; there is no more justifica-
tion here than in the standing context for 'a return to property law concepts of title and
possessory interests [alone], which are remote from the purposes of the fourth amend-
ment.' " Id. at 1661 n.295 (alteration in original) (quoting Weinreb, supra note 251, at
63-64). Professor Coombs, and Professor Weinreb before her, see supra note 251, are
correct: The Court is far too unappreciative of nuanced relationships to accurately re-
flect either authority or risk. However, suppression hearings might be too crude a fo-
rum for heightened fact-sensitivity and understanding. Admissibility decisions need not
be highly individualized to be fair. Fine tuning should be directed only at the discovery
of the parties' contractual and property interests. Frankly, a story any richer would in
most instances contain much that we do not need to know.
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of perception and not of fact,3 50 currently and needlessly founders
for lack of any concrete source outside the Court's holdings to in-
form that perception.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the positive law offers no unassailable solution, the
current approach simply will not do. When the Court does consider
the positive law in fixing expectations, the importance of those laws
takes on an accordion-like quality. For Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, the positive law was a one-way street-when it helped the de-
fendant they liked it; when it helped the government they did not.351
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, and Chief Justices Burger and Rehn-
quist also travel a one-way street, only in the opposite direction.3 52
Justice White also belongs to this group, although not without ex-
ception.355 Justices Powell and Blackmun tend to view the positive
law in the prosecution's favor, except when it comes to overflight.
Even more unpredictable are the opinions of Justice Stevens, who
takes inconsistent positions without explanation.354
350 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
35' Compare United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(police violation of positive law of trespass constitutes search), United States v. Oliver,
466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same) and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 114 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (interest in place searched or property
seized invokes fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure)
with Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (compliance with
FAA regulations does not necessarily mean no search) and California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (whether garbage is abandoned not neces-
sarily determinative of whether search of it occurred).
352 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting that portion of Justice
White's opinion that held no search of Dunn's property occurred despite the trespass
onto his "open field"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (Burger, CJ.) (police
do not search when they are in public navigable airspace); Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (Burger, CJ.) (EPA's noncompetitor status and position in
public navigable airspace violated neither Michigan's trade-secret law nor any property
interest of Dow); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (O'Connor, J, concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (successful challenger must show
superpossession-a protectible interest both in the place searched and the thing seized);
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J.) (ownership of drugs insufficient to ground pri-
vacy expectation).
353 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294 (trespass onto open fields does not necessarily violate prop-
erty owner's privacy). But see, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (permission to ride in car confers privacy expectation on passenger who
lacks property interest in car or its contents).
354 Compare Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque
garbage bag left at curbside for pick-up), Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294 (officers may view activi-
ties in curtilage from vantage point obtained by trespass onto defendant's open field),
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207 (overflight within FAA regulations is no search), Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (same), and Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 98 (owner-
ship of seized drugs not enough to challenge search of purse where they were stored)
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No doubt ownership or possession is for every member of the
Court an indicia of a protected interest.A5 5 The uncertainty, prop-
erly savaged in Aleinikoff's treatment of balancing, is over how to
weight the interest.a56 Property law remains "marginally relevant,"
"weighty," "principal," and not altogether "snuffed out. 3' 57 De-
spite the vocabulary, property law currently contributes nothing but
verbiage to the Court's opinions.
Ready objections to a new reliance on the laws of property, tort,
crimes, contracts, or a law enforcement agency's internal guidelines
are available.358 Granted, the argument goes, privacy is indetermi-
nate. But so are possession, use, and control, even in their property
law context, let alone on foreign turf.3 59 To insinuate the positive
with Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest has privacy expectation in
premises), Riley, 488 U.S. at 456 (joining Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy violated when helicopter did precisely what fixed-wing aircraft had done
in Ciraolo), Karo, 468 U.S. at 728 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(nonconsensual installation of transmitter is a seizure), Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184 (joining
Marshall, J., dissenting) (police searched defendant when they did precisely what they
had done in Dunn) and Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (joining White, J., dissenting) (permission
to ride in car confers privacy expectation on passenger).
355 But cf ThomasJ. Hickey & Rolando del Carmen, The Evolution of Standing in Search
and Seizure Cases, 27 GRIM. L. BULL. 134, 146 (1991) ("[A] majority of the present Court
appears to believe that property interests should have little bearing on a defendant's
ability to assert a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.").
356 See Aleinikoff, supra note 201:
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that although no one factor is con-
clusive, a person's possession, ownership, or control of property, as well as the na-
ture of the place it or he is in, and the legitimacy of its or his presence there, are all
factors that affect the extent of privacy to be afforded his person.
William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 641-42 (1983); Tomkovicz, supra
note 9, at 657-58 ("The Court ... has neither proffered a comprehensive catalogue of
relevant property concerns, nor prescribed the weight particular property interests
ought to be accorded."); id. at 694-95 ("Katz directly repudiated the controlling function
of property .... [but] later cases reveal so strong a continuing attachment to those for-
merly dispositive factors that Olmstead's prerequisite of a physically invasive trespass has
retained an inordinate effect upon, sometimes dictating, constitutional scope in the
post-Katz era."); id. at 695 (property interests should be "relevant criteria," "two among
many factors in the threshold analysis .. "); Wilkens, supra note 3, at 1116 ("Katz now
can be understood not as eliminating the relevance of physical intrusion, but rather as
shifting the emphasis placed on that analytical element."); Bush, supra note 170, at 1792
("[A] property interest may be evidence of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment; it is simply not conclusive evidence."); Corrada, supra note 170, at
689 (In Dow, "[b]oth [Burger and Powell's] opinions made selective use of property
analysis without explaining the appropriate limits of such concepts in Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine.").
357 Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544-45 (1992).
358 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The
Use, Misuse and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89" IICH.
L. REV. 442 (1990).
359 See WILSON, supra note 137, at 55 ("[T]he issue of whether a property right exists
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law into Fourth Amendment decisionmaking would only redirect re-
viewing courts to new problems of indeterminacy, not solve the old
ones. That claim, however, can be raised to contest any reform; it is
less forceful when used to defend language that is indeterminate by
design, than when used to contest an approach committed more to
clarity than to context.
There are other concerns which make this proposal only tenta-
tive. For instance, which positive laws are coextensive with privacy?
To force such an inquiry threatens to liberate us not at all from Katz.
Or is it even necessary that a given law have a privacy component
for it to dictate a Fourth Amendment outcome? If not, then which
interests expressed in the positive law should control? To this, I
suggest that the great majority of property laws are privacy-
oriented, as are contracts in which property is a subject or concern.
Even those laws that are not, however, should be conclusive of the
parties' expectations when the government is acting in the role of
lawbreaker or contract-breacher, at least when it is the violation or
breach that permits the government to gather the evidence. 360
When the government is behaving lawfully, Katz acts as a backstop,
as a second look at whether the positive law fairly reflects a given
defendant's expectations.
I make these proposals aware of the negative image Lockeian-
based theory portrays in a culture where property owners have re-
peatedly flouted the true needs of those who are in many ways de-
pendent on them.36 1 Certainly there is something oily about
commodifying Fourth Amendment protection. But property inter-
ests need not be bought; ownership is but one form of property in-
terest. Property interests lie in leaseholds and social relationships;
literally, anyone "legitimately on the premises" has a property inter-
est deserving of Fourth Amendment respect.
One remaining objection is that a Fourth Amendment which
depends on state law would be anything but unitary. Fixed constitu-
in a particular case is not always easy to determine ....") (citing State v. Robbins, 24
N.E. 978, 980 (Ind. 1890)); Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature
of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529, 548 n.133 (1978) ("[T]here is no
word more ambiguous in its meaning than Possession." (quoting National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914)).
360 See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text; cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 259,
§ 36, at 220-34 (deviation from reasonable standard of conduct may be conclusively or
presumptively demonstrated by defendant's violation of a statute that contemplated the
type risk to person in plaintiff's position).
361 See Reich, supra note 109, at 772 ("During the industrial revolution, when property
was liberated from feudal restraints, philosophers hailed property as the basis of liberty
.... But as private property grew, so did abuses resulting from its use. ... Property
became power over others ....").
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tional boundaries would yield to the whims of state legislatures, and
citizens would be forced to vote with their feet to find a state where
the "federal" standard suited them.a62 Given, however, that all
states have nearly identical laws of abandonment and trespass,3 63
and deal daily with issues of contract and statutory interpretation,
the threat of widespread state-by-state discrepancies is chimerical.
As for the fear of aggrandizing local law, that never has stopped us
before; the Constitution already depends in part on local law in a
variety of areas.3 64 Insofar as tradition is a legitimating factor, a
more powerful objection than these is necessary to dismiss this ten-
tative proposal.
362 Cf Coombs, supra note 3, at 1609 n.62 (suggesting that Silverman andJeffers could
be seen as "adopting a federal common law of property for Fourth Amendment cases,
with a distinct regime of entitlements and greater protection against intrusions.").
363 See, e.g., 1 CJ.S. Abandonment § 2 (1985) (compiling cases on the abandonment of
property); 87 CJ.S. Trespass §§ 1, 144-46 (1954) (compiling statutes and cases on the
tort and criminal law of trespass in all 50 states).
364 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs ex-
cuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state
is free to regulate."); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (in addressing
the scope of the Sixth Amendment's requirement that criminal defendants receive effec-
tive assistance of counsel, the Court has looked to professional codes of ethics and con-
cluded that "(flederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal
trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal pro-
ceedings appear fair to all who observe them"); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)
(noting interplay between professional codes of ethics and Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel in case where defense counsel refused to represent
a client who intended to commit perjury); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
("The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be . . . whether the 'average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest .... ); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972) (property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "are created and ... defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law"); United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 354-57 (1966) (applying Texas property law in action to obtainjudgment
on SBA loan, Court noted its willingness to apply state rules as federal law despite the
consequent diversity in the rights and obligations of the United States in the various
states). See also Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA.
L. REV. 863, 881 (1988) ("The justices now appear ready to abandon the Green view of
hearsay and confrontation as related, but independent, concepts. They apparently are
warming to Wigmore's argument that whenever the hearsay rules, as they evolve, are
satisfied, the confrontation clause requirements also are met.").
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